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ABSTRACT
Early attempts at strategic bombing led theorist to reason that it could offer a
revolutionary new means of winning wars. Airpower visionaries such as Guilio Douhet,
Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell advocated a Sherman - like strategy of attrition in
which air strikes on the enemy’s vital economic centers would destroy his war – making
capability and crush his will to resist. In the inner – war period the Air Corps Tactical
School, occupied with formulating a strategic air doctrine, refined that idea, which was
the central concept underlying AWPD-1, the basic statement governing strategic
bombing elaborated by the Air War Plans Division of the War Department in mid – 1941.
AWPD-1 identified the key German economic targets as electric power
generation, transportation nodes, and the petroleum industry. American planners
believed that effective attacks on those targets demanded Daylight Precision Bombing
raids. An intense six-month bombing campaign, they thought, might defeat Germany
without the need of a ground invasion of Europe. After the United States entered the war
and as the Anglo – American invasion of North Africa was under way, British and
American leaders agreed to execute an “around the clock” Combined Bomber Offensive
(CBO) to bring about the progressive destruction of the German military, industrial, and
economic system.
Strategic bombing reached new levels of power and achievement during the war.
The CBO undermined German war production, helped achieve air superiority, and paved
the way for the Allied land invasion. Concentrated attacks on German aircraft plants,
transportation centers, and oil facilities paid particularly valuable dividends. But
strategic bombing failed to destroy enemy morale and it did not render a ground war
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unnecessary, as the visionaries had predicted, in part because of repeated changes in
target priorities and the diversion of bombers to missions elsewhere, particularly those in
connection with the Normandy invasion.

v

INTRODUCTION
Strategic bombing throughout its history has evoked a powerful emotional
response and has been the subject of much debate. Since its inception, there has been a
tendency to regard airpower, particularly strategic bombing, as revolutionary in that it
added a new dimension to warfare and overturned the established principles of war.
Some scholars question its effectiveness and the morality of conducting strategic
bombing campaigns, while advocates praise its efficiency and the reduced cost of
manpower, casualties, and money.
World War II witnessed the first full application of strategic airpower in war.
Allied air forces dropped nearly 2.7 million tons of bombs, flew 1,440,000 bomber
sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties. The number of men lost in air action was 79,265
Americans and 79,281 British. More than 18,000 American and 22,000 British planes
were lost or damaged beyond repair. Bombing raids on Germany destroyed 3,600,000
dwellings; approximately 20 percent of the total number of buildings in that country were
destroyed or heavily damaged. Survey estimates showed some 300,000 German civilians
killed and 780,000 wounded. The number made homeless reached 7,500,000.1 Allied
bombing reduced the principal German cities largely to hollow walls and piles of rubble.
What impact did all of this have on German morale, production, and the overall
ability of the home front to support the war effort? Was strategic airpower a decisive
factor leading to the defeat of Germany? Were the gains worth the severe losses suffered
by the Allies and innocent civilians? Strategic bombing remains controversial because of
the difficulty in proving its effectiveness. Success cannot be determined simply in terms
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of physical damage. Evaluating the effect on vital targets requires analysis of the entire
enemy system and the impact is not often immediately apparent.
The developments of doctrine, plans, the execution, and effectiveness of strategic
bombing against Germany, and the Combined Bomber Offensive in particular, are the
subject of this study.
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CHAPTER 1
ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING THOUGHT
“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon
those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.” Guilio Douhet

This chapter establishes the baseline of the development of strategic bombing
thought. It analyzes the ideas and theories developed by classical airpower theorists such
as Guilio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell during the inter-war years.
Additionally, it compares their ideas, and the impact these ideas had on the faculty and
students of the Air Corps Tactical School, against the theories and doctrine developed by
American air planners.
General Guilio Douhet of Italy, considered the father of strategic bombing theory,
was among the first people to write about the use of airpower in war. Many of his ideas
and predictions were wrong, but his basic concepts and ideas are present today in
strategic planning. The Persian Gulf War is an example of what Douhet predicted
airpower could accomplish. His formula for victory by gaining command of the air,
neutralizing the enemy’s strategic centers, and maintaining the defensive on the ground
while taking the offensive in the air, was the underpinning of the Coalition strategy.1
World War I was a protracted affair characterized by colossal damage and
destruction, mass casualties, and stalemate. The outcome of trench warfare profoundly
affected strategists. Appalled by the carnage, they feared that such a catastrophe would
reoccur. Total war and wars of attrition seemed to be the norm for the future. Total war
was more than a conflict between armies; it involved the entire human, material, and
psychological resources of a nation. Nations had to be exhausted before they would
admit defeat. Reaching that point, however, became increasingly difficult in the new
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industrial age in which factories could produce endless supplies and implements of war.
Advancing technologies in weaponry, such as the machine gun, had given the defender
an overwhelming advantage. These weapons placed in prepared positions gave the
defender the ascendancy in land warfare and meant that an attacking force had to be
vastly superior in numbers to be successful. Military strategists strove to develop new
tactics and techniques that would break the stalemate of war, create mobility, and achieve
a quick, decisive, and inexpensive victory.
Douhet was a product of World War I and had witnessed the carnage that resulted
when outdated tactics and strategy went up against high- technology weapons. He served
first as an artillery officer and then commander of Italy’s first aviation battalion in 1912.2
He saw first hand how ineffective land battle had become in total wars between modern
powers. He was convinced that the new technology of the machine gun, poison gas, and
the aircraft made warfare between large land armies obsolete. Technology had converted
land wars into defensive struggles, leading to stalemate and removing any possibility of
clear-cut victory. The impact on the British civilian population from the limited strategic
bombing of London by German Zeppelins greatly influenced Douhet, who saw airpower
as a revolution in military technology. 3
Douhet became convinced that strategic bombing would be the antidote for
stalemate on the battlefield. With its complete freedom of action and direction, the
airplane could operate unopposed in the third dimension. Nothing from the ground, he
thought, could interfere with a plane in flight.4 It could fly unopposed over fortified lines
of defense, making them obsolete and breakthroughs unnecessary. The use of aircraft
would expand the dimensions of the battlefields to include all the lands and seas of
nations at war. Aviation would go on the offensive and seize the initiative by applying
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the fundamentals of war: mass, simplicity, and surprise. In this new total war, limited
only by the boundaries of the nations involved, the “battlefield” would include not only
actual combatants, but civilians as well. “Mercifully, the decision will be quick in this
kind of war, since the decisive blow will be directed at civilians, that element of the
countries at war least able to sustain themselves [sic],” said Douhet. “These future wars
may yet prove to be more humane than wars in the past in spite of all, because they may
in the long run shed less blood.”5
The “center of gravity” is a Clausewitzian concept-and defined in Army manuals
as the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends, that
characteristic, capability, or location from which forces derive their freedom of action,
physical strength, or will to fight-the destruction of which would deprive the enemy of
the capability to wage war. Douhet saw the war as a battle of wills between the
belligerent countries. He identified the will of the people as a center of gravity that could
be easily manipulated through the application of strategic bombing. Air attacks would
destroy the enemy’s vital industrial centers, directly targeting the civilian population, thus
crushing the enemy’s will to resist, and bringing about a quick, even humane, victory.
Douhet based his strategy on several assumptions and misconceptions. First, he
thought that all wars in the future would be total wars and that the defensive form of
ground warfare would continue its dominance and ground engagements, therefore, would
remain static. He also believed that airpower was inherently offensive and that the
bomber would always get through to strike its target. Douhet saw war as a battle of wills.
To bend the enemy’s will one must put him in intolerable circumstances. The best way
to do that would be to attack directly the defenseless populations of his cities and great
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industrial centers. In his view, civilian morale was unstable, which meant that
bombardment would cause panic and possible revolt.
Douhet realized that, in order for the aircraft to become a dominant weapon, it
would require freedom from the ground commander. He called for the creation of an
independent air force, under the command of an aviator, which was equal in importance
with the army and navy.6 This air force should consist of enough combat power to be
proportionate to the enemy’s strength and should possess maximum bombing power.
Douhet went on to say that armies and navies should remain small, their primary
objective being to fix and hold the enemy forces in place, leaving the air force free to
maneuver and attack the enemy’s vital centers.
Douhet’s fundamental precept was that an air force must achieve command of the
air. A country that lost control of its airspace had to endure whatever air attacks an
enemy chose to carry out. As he put it:

To have command of the air means to be in a position to wield offensive power so
great it defies human imagination. It means to be able to cut an enemy’s army and navy
off from their [sic] bases of operation and nullify their [sic] chances of winning the war.
It means complete protection of one’s own country. In short, it means to be in position to
win. To be defeated in the air is to be defeated and at the mercy of the enemy.7

In order to achieve command of the air one must defeat the enemy’s air force. The best
way to accomplish this would be to conduct a preemptive strike against the enemy’s
assets while on the ground.

It is not enough to shoot down all the birds in flight if you want to wipe out a
species; there remain the eggs and the nest. The most effective method would be to
destroy the eggs and the nest systematically, because no species of bird can remain
continuously aloft. Similarly, seeking out and destroying an enemy’s airplanes while in
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flight is least effective. A much better way is to destroy his airports, supply bases, and
centers of production.8

With command of the air achieved, the next step would be to exploit that advantage and
destroy the enemy’s war-making capability by attacking his vital centers. Douhet
realized that the key to airpower was targeting. He identified five basic target systems as
the vital centers of a modern country: industry, transportation infrastructure,
communication nodes, government buildings, and the will of the people.9
Douhet believed that the will of the people was the most important category. He
was convinced that it was so intrinsically decisive, that any elaboration on the other vital
centers was unnecessary.10 He reminded his readers that the true objective in war was the
enemy’s will and only aircraft could strike at it. In the new industrial age and era of total
wars, all people were combatants and their collective will had to be broken. The most
effective way to accomplish that, according to Douhet, was through urban terror
bombing.11 Civilian morale would quickly disintegrate under aerial bombardment, he
believed, and civilians would coerce their government into suing for peace or would rise
in revolt.
Douhet did not think that bombing accuracy was especially important. All attacks
would be on area targets carried out by massive aerial fleets. The air force would hit
multiple targets simultaneously, making a concentrated defense impossible. Heavily
armored, self-reliant aircraft called battle planes would execute the attacks. The use of a
mixture of high explosive, incendiary, and gas or biological bombs would create a
synergistic effect. The explosives would produce rubble, the incendiaries would start
fires, and the chemicals would prevent firefighters from extinguishing the flames.

8

Douhet had his earliest and greatest influence in America.12 Many of Douhet’s
early writings, including translated copies of Command of the Air, were available at the
U.S. Air Corps Tactical School during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1917, the United States
had sent a commission to Europe to decide which aircraft were most suitable for
construction in America. A member of the team, a Major Gorrell, met with Douhet’s
friend Count Caproni to discuss purchase rights for the construction of several hundred
heavy bombers in America. Gorrell would later have a considerable influence on the
initial structuring of American strategic bombing theory. His relationship with Caproni
helped plant the seed for the future development of American airpower strategy.13
Although there are many similarities between Douhet and Hugh Trenchard’s
ideas, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has strongly denied that Douhet influenced the
development of its theory and doctrine. Douhet advocated direct attacks against cities
and the civilian population to crush morale, whereas Trenchard advocated targeting the
civilian support infrastructure, i.e. transportation, communications, water, and electricity,
to undermine morale of the worker and indirectly affect the will of the people to support
any war effort. The British policy of area bombing came about more from necessity than
from prewar theory and doctrine.
Hugh Trenchard served as the first RAF commander from 1919 to 1930. The
First World War made an even greater impression on him than it did on Douhet.
Witnessing the effect of strategic bombing on the citizens of London made Trenchard
believe in the efficacy of strategic airpower and its ability to strike deep into the enemy’s
heartland and shatter his will. Trenchard stated that, “ Owing to the unlimited space in
the air, [and] the difficulty one machine has of seeing another,” he said, “it is impossible
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for the enemy and his airplanes to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing his lines and
reaching their targets if the pilots have the initiative and determination to do so.”14
Trenchard based his strategic philosophy on the assumption that the effect
bombing had on morale was much more devastating than the physical damage it caused.
Like Douhet and Mitchell, he believed in the offensive nature of airpower. He was
convinced that the bomber would always get through and that there was no need for the
development of escort fighters.15 Like Douhet, Trenchard believed that air supremacy
was the paramount factor in battle and had to be accomplished first by destroying the
enemy’s air force through attacks conducted against his airfields and support bases.
Trenchard also advocated the massing of large aerial fleets under the cover of darkness to
maximize the effectiveness of attacks.
The key to Trenchard’s concept of strategic airpower lay in the selection of
targets. He agreed that the enemy’s center of gravity was the nation’s will (morale).
Through prolonged attacks against his vital centers, one could affect the enemy’s will to
resist. These vital centers included organized systems of production, supply,
communications, and transportation.16 Unlike Douhet, Trenchard did not advocate the
bombing of population centers with the intent to cause revolt. He rejected the concept of
area bombing and called for precision attacks on specific targets. Indeed, he thought it
would be immoral to target civilians directly. He assumed that the destruction of the
workers’ supporting infrastructure would indirectly affect the morale and will of the
people.
The British concept of area or urban bombing emerged later as a result of wartime
consequences and should not be associated with Trenchard’s basic thesis. London was
suffering from the Blitz in 1940-41 and had endured numerous defeats on the ground.
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British bombers had suffered heavy losses during daylight operations and had resorted to
the relative safety and inaccuracy of night operations. During this pivotal period, Air
Chief Marshall Arthur Harris initiated a bombing campaign against Germany’s major
cities aimed to destroy enemy morale by targeting residential areas.17 Area bombing also
became a retaliatory measure in response to Germany’s terror bombing of British cities.
Trenchard had a substantial impact on military thinking in the United States
through his association with the American Air Service and Air Corps. His commitment to
the idea of strategic bombing and his argument for the need of an independent air force
particularly influenced American airpower enthusiasts such as General Billy Mitchell.
Mitchell formed many of his ideas about airpower from his experiences and his close
relationship with Trenchard during World War I.
Mitchell is the most famous and controversial figure in American airpower
history. The son of a wealthy Wisconsin senator, he enlisted in the army as a private
during the Spanish American War. He quickly gained a commission, due to the
intervention of his father, and served in the Signal Corps. He was an outstanding junior
officer, displaying a rare degree of initiative, courage, and leadership. After the war, he
became the youngest member to serve on the Army General Staff. He became interested
in aviation, and in 1916 at the age of 38, he learned to fly. During WWI, he rose to the
rank of Brigadier General and commanded all American air combat units in France. For
his heroics in battle, he received the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Distinguished
Service Medal. He worked closely with British General Trenchard, and learned of
Douhet’s concepts, ideas about strategic bombing, and the use of airpower.18
After the war, Mitchell served as the deputy chief of the Air Service and became
the leading voice for the ascendancy of airpower. He became embroiled in battles with
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the War and Navy Departments for their lack of vision regarding airpower. In an attempt
to prove that surface fleets were obsolete, and to prove the capabilities of airpower, he
conducted bombing tests in which he sank several battleships.19
In 1925, Mitchell was court-martialed for insubordination after accusing senior
leaders in the Army and Navy of incompetence and of the “almost treasonable
administration of the national defense.” Found guilty, the board suspended him from
active duty for five years without pay. Mitchell chose to resign instead and spent the next
decade writing about and preaching the gospel of airpower. He was the first prominent
American to espouse publicly a vision of strategic airpower that would dominate future
wars. In 1946, he posthumously received the Medal of Honor for outstanding pioneer
service and foresight in the field of American military aviation.20
Mitchell’s most lasting contribution to the development of American airpower
was his vision of an autonomous air force that would conduct operations, such as
strategic bombing, aimed at achieving independent results rather than simply supporting
land and sea forces. Aviators, he argued, constituted an elite breed and they alone could
understand the proper employment of airpower. To carry out the mission of strategic
bombing effectively, he stated, it was necessary to separate aviation from the Army and
Navy because they were too traditional and surface oriented. Mitchell proclaimed that
bombers could win wars by destroying an enemy nation’s war making capability and will
to fight, and that doing so would yield a victory that was quicker and cheaper than one
obtained by surface forces.21 “Independent applied airpower in the form of strategic
bombers could paralyze an enemy’s vital centers, thus obviating the need to confront
enemy surface forces or to even advance through enemy territory on the ground,” he
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argued. “The influence of airpower on the ability of one nation to impress its will on
another in an armed conflict will be decisive.”22
Mitchell based his theories about the application of strategic bombing on the
premise that airpower was revolutionary in nature. He concluded that the ascendancy of
the ground defensive would persist. Airpower operated in the third dimension, not bound
by the limitations of ground warfare. He saw airpower as being an inherently offensive
weapon that would bypass enemy lines of defense. Wars in the future would be total
ones that made everyone a combatant. Based on his experience during WWI, he
concluded that civilian morale was fragile and therefore susceptible to the effects of
bombing.23 Mitchell claimed that in such a war, airpower could bomb the enemy’s vital
economic centers to deny him his war production facilities, fatally weakening his ability
to resist and crushing his moral. Anti –Aircraft- Artillery (AAA) was ineffective and no
other measures were in place to stop such an offensive; the bomber, therefore, would
always get through.
Like Douhet, Mitchell asserted that, before commencing offensive operations
against the enemy’s vital centers, one must obtain command of the air. Both agreed that
control of the air was the prerequisite for follow-on operations. Once established, one
could attack the enemy’s vital centers at will. They differed, however, on how to achieve
command of the air. Douhet thought the best method was to destroy the enemy air force
on the ground. Mitchell argued that air combat was also a suitable means. Attacking
vital centers would compel the hostile air force to take to the air where pursuit aircraft
could engage and destroy them.24
Mitchell, like Douhet, identified civilian morale as the enemy’s center of gravity.
Civilian will was exceedingly fragile, Mitchell thought, so once-bombed civilians were
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unlikely to continue supporting the war effort.

25

Although he agreed all-out attacks on

general populations were more humane than the devastation and suffering of trench
warfare, he opposed targeting civilians directly and advocated breaking their morale
through destruction of other vital centers.26 Air forces would attack not so much the
people themselves, but centers of production. In his view, the mere threat of bombing a
town would cause evacuation.27 But bombing production centers was not enough, “To
gain lasting victory the hostile nation’s power to make war must be destroyed,” he said.
“This means the manufactories, means of communication, the food products, even the
farms, the fuel and oil and the place where people live and carry on their daily lives. Not
only must these things be rendered incapable of supplying armed forces but the peoples’
desire to renew the combat at a later date must be discouraged.” 28
Mitchell based his targeting strategy on air attacks that would paralyze an
enemy’s vital centers and its ability to continue hostilities. These centers include great
cities, factories, raw materials, foodstuffs, supplies, and modes of transportation and
communication.29 The air force would strike immediately at the enemy manufacturing
and food centers, railways, bridges, canals, and harbors reaching the heart of a country
and gaining victory in war using explosive bombs and gas to cause evacuation and
cessation of industry.30
In contrast to Douhet, Mitchell believed that no single type of aircraft was
adequate; he therefore rejected Douhet' s concept of the all
-purpose battle plane and the
emphasis on unrestrained air offense at the expense of any defensive measures.31
Mitchell favored the construction of pursuit aircraft as well as attack and reconnaissance
aircraft.32 He argued that an air force should include not only the bomber, but, local air
defense units, and auxiliary air units as well.33 Mitchell was forward thinking in the use
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and development of technology. He predicted the use of radar and gyroscopic
instruments for guiding aircraft to targets and the use of state-of-the-art bombsites for
precision strikes on targets.
Mitchell was instrumental in creating the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). His
ideas were the underpinning of the school’s curriculum and his bombing manual served
as a textbook. Many of his protégés filled key positions on the faculty and promoted his
vision of independent airpower founded on the bomber.34 Established as a training center
for the Air Corps field grade officers, the ACTS served as the unofficial center for
formulating American air policies and doctrine during the interwar years. The theories
and doctrine developed by the faculty and students of the ACTS formed the basis for
America’s strategic air war plans during WWII.35
The ACTS operated on the same assumptions as Mitchell in developing the
following five propositions of American air warfare:

The ultimate goal of any air attack is to undermine the enemy’s morale and his
will to resist. Airmen can best destroy morale by attacking the interior of an opponent’s
territory. Attacks against vital points or centers will not only terrorize populations into
submission but also save lives. Airpower is an inherently offensive weapon that is
impossible to stop. Airpower is the only tool that can undermine national morale with
minimum effort and material and should be used extensively in strategic operations.36

The school established the primacy of the bomber and developed its core
principles of employment through the execution of High Altitude Precision Daylight
Bombing (HAPDB), directed against the key nodes of an enemy’s industrial-economic
system.37 This industrial web theory became doctrine. The ACTS went on to identify key
enemy economic vulnerabilities based on a model test of the American Midwest, and
developed particular target sets for destruction. These target sets included electrical
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power generation and distribution, transportation networks, fuel refining and distribution
centers, food distribution centers, steel and other manufacturing plants. The industrial
web concept called for selective targeting to disrupt or paralyze critical sectors of the
enemy economy in order to undermine his war-making capability and will to fight.38
The ACTS’ strategy of HAPDB came about for the following reasons.
Theoretically, modern bombers could operate at altitudes beyond the reach of defending
fighters and antiaircraft artillery fire and fly faster than any existing operational pursuit
aircraft. Heavily armed, most considered the B-17 capable of defending itself against
enemy fighter attacks. Therefore, massed bomber formations should be able to penetrate
enemy air defenses without significant losses. Navigational aids were too primitive to
supplant visual, line of sight techniques requiring daylight operations. Advances in
technology, especially the development of the Norden bombsight, led the ACTS to
believe that daytime precision attacks by massive bombing formations against selective
targets were possible.39
The ACTS based their strategy on the principles of surprise, mass, objective, and
economy of force. The execution of the industrial web plan called for the use of all
available airpower in the conduct of a strategic bombing campaign early in the conflict,
and focused on selected target groups. Unlike Douhet and Mitchell, the ACTS did not
believe that command of the air or destruction of the enemy’s air force was a prerequisite
for conducting air exploitation operations. Therefore, in an economy of force effort,
aircraft would strike at the enemy’s key nodes immediately, instead of pursuing the
destruction of the enemy’s air force.
The recurring theme among the classical airpower theorists was that to succeed in
warfare one must identify the enemy’s center of gravity and attack it, and that airpower
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would be the most effective instrument for accomplishing that task. Additionally, with
the exception of the ACTS, all early theorists agreed command of the air was necessary
for military success. John Warden stated in Planning the Air Campaign, “In all cases the
enemy center of gravity must be identified and struck. The thing to look for is the place
where an investment in attack will yield the greatest return. Where these can be found,
they should be attacked and re-attacked.”40
The early airpower theorists shared several common assumptions. Douhet,
Trenchard, and Mitchell all assumed that future wars would be total and there would be
no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. They identified the will of the
people as the enemy’s center of gravity. Attacking the civilian population either directly
or indirectly determined the outcome of the conflict. Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell all
asserted that airpower was revolutionary and would be the decisive factor in future
conflicts.41 All believed in the inherently offensive characteristics of airpower and its use
as the instrument of choice to attack the enemy’s center of gravity. The need for the
creation of an equal and independent air force is a common argument among Douhet,
Trenchard, Mitchell, and the ACTS.
However, there are many weakness, flaws, and miscalculations in Douhet,
Mitchell, Trenchard, and the ACTS’ strategies. All miscalculated the effect of individual
bombs upon targets, and mistakenly believed that the bomber would always get through.
With the exception of Mitchell, all failed to account for advances in defensive
technology. All overestimated the frailty of public morale and the ability to manipulate
an enemy’s will through strategic bombing alone. A serious flaw common throughout
was the miscalculation of internal ability to gain intelligence and effectively conduct
targeting and assess damage.
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It is key to understanding these basic theories and ideas when analyzing the
concepts and plans developed for the execution of the strategic air campaign against
Germany. Strict adherence to these principles without detailed mission analysis would
lead to catastrophic results. Conversely, failure to follow the basic principles, such as
attaining command of the air before pursuing a strategic bombing campaign, would also
prove costly.
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CHAPTER 2
PLANNING AND WAGING STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE
This chapter covers the formulation and development of America’s strategic air
war plans from AWPD-1 to the Casablanca Conference, and reflects the Airman’s belief
about the revolutionary nature of airpower and the hope that strategic bombing could win
the war on its own. Additionally, it will cover the creation of the Eighth Air Force and
examine the impact its early missions had on the development of the Combined Bomber
Offensive Plan. Air Force leaders would encounter early problems in implementing the
strategic bombing plans. American policy of High Altitude Precision Daylight Bombing
(HAPDB) would cause disagreements with the British over the proper employment
techniques of strategic bombers.
The advent of airpower and the development of strategic bombing doctrine forced
governments to reassess their policies of national defense and overall grand strategies.
Countries were no longer immune to direct attack, and could not depend on the protection
of a natural sea barrier. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) aptly warned Americans
“they could no longer measure [their] safety in terms of miles on a map. As long as
aircraft range continued to increase the threat of an effective air attack became greater.”1
This threat led to a new arms race as all the major powers developed policies for air
rearmament. Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry Stimson were enthusiastic about the
use of aircraft in any future war. In 1938, Roosevelt authorized a provisional rearmament
program of 30,000 aircraft, which Congress significantly reduced.2
The outbreak of World War II led to the development of close ties and firm
commitments between the United States and Great Britain. FDR persuaded Congress late
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in 1939 to repeal the arms embargo, which enabled the United States to sell military
equipment to the allies on a cash-and-carry basis. In September 1940, the two countries
established a joint committee to discuss and arrange sales of aircraft to Britain and
achieve standardization of production. The United States expanded its own aircraft
industry enormously to provide Britain the bulk of its new aircraft. Roosevelt referred to
this policy as the arsenal of democracy.3 The unexpected collapse of France, followed by
the Battle of Britain, convinced many American political and military leaders of the
possibility of world domination by the Axis powers. The changed strategic picture led
Roosevelt to move rapidly toward a policy of all-out military cooperation, short of war,
with Great Britain. One critical step in that direction was the decision at the end of 1940
to hold secret military staff talks with British representatives.
The first major discussions of strategy between Britain and America began in
January 1941, known as the American-British Conference (ABC 1). An essential
element in the broad plan that emerged from those talks was a sustained air offensive
against Germany and Axis-controlled territory, in the event America entered the war,
which would precede an eventual land offensive in Europe. The British were to provide
secure bases to the Americans in both Britain and the Mediterranean for the conduct of
air operations. Roosevelt and Stimson supported bombing for political reasons, the most
important of which was the hope that American isolationism would be easier to break
down if intervention with a bombing campaign promised low casualties and expenditures
for great military effect.4
The strategic scenario discussed, which shaped the talks, was one in which Great
Britain and the U.S. stood against Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Allies deemed the
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Atlantic-European Theater as the decisive point, and developed a Europe-first strategy.
Offensive measures would include sustained air operations and the early elimination of
Italy, with initial raids and minor offensives conducted against the continent. America
would expand the arsenal of democracy to include support for all neutrals and
belligerents who opposed the Axis. The ultimate objective was a build up of forces for
an eventual land offensive against Germany.5
The (American) Joint Army-Navy Board approved the recommendations of ABC1 and developed the subsequent American war plan known as Rainbow 5. Air strategy
assumed a particular importance for the Americans because the air offensive was one of
the few ways in which the United States could participate fully and quickly in the war
against Germany.6
The increased air objectives in Rainbow 5 necessitated an expanded command
structure within the GHQ Air Force. Secretary Stimson directed the placing of the air
arm under one responsible head. On June 20, 1941, Army Regulation 95-5 created the
Army Air Force (AAF) and established General Hap Arnold as its Chief and as
Marshall’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. Arnold established an Air Staff, removing most
of the Plans Division from the office of the Chief of the Air Corps, and designated its
sections as A-1 (personnel), A-2 (intelligence), A-3 (operations and training), A-4
(supply and maintenance), and Air War Plans, which consisted of four officers.7 The Air
War Plans Division (AWPD) prepared over-all plans for the control of the activities of
the Army Air Force.
To provide some realistic guidance to the office of Production Management,
Roosevelt in July 1941 directed the Secretaries of War and Navy “to prepare an estimate
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of the overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.”8 The
President’s directive dictated that production requirements and responsibilities follow the
strategic concepts set forth in the ABC-1 agreement and the current U.S. war plans.9 The
task of compiling the overall estimate of ground, naval, and air requirements fell to the
War Plans Division of the War Departments General Staff (WDGS).
General Arnold requested that the AWPD complete the task of writing the air
requirement portion of the plan, thus freeing the WDGS to concentrate on ground
requirements. The War Plans Division gave the AWPD nine days to develop an estimate
of the maximum number of squadrons required to garrison a great number of geographic
sites and to hold as reserves of opportunity. However, the AWPD undertook the task to
prepare a comprehensive air plan for the defeat of the Axis.10 The Air Staff completed
“Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1), Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Force”
on August 12.
The War Plans Division had concluded that it would take a couple of years after
the United States went to war for the Army to raise, train, and deploy the millions of men
needed to invade the continent of Europe. Setting the conditions for an invasion included
severely weakening the German war machine through the bombing of the German war
production facilities and achieving air superiority by defeating the German Air Force.
Although strategic air operations could begin on a limited scale about twelve months
after the outbreak of war, the forces needed to conduct the air offensive would not reach
full strength in England until approximately eighteen months after M-day (mobilization).
The full six months of strategic aerial warfare would end two years after the outbreak of
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war.11 Therefore, the AWPD planned a strategic bombing campaign that would reach its
peak during the six months preceding the invasion.12
AWPD-1 was not simply a list of supplies and production requirements, but a
clear expression of strategic tasks. The Air Staff planners favored a general air strategy,
with a sustained and unremitting air offensive against the German war economy. This
idea followed the Industrial web theory and doctrine developed at the Air Corps Tactical
School (ACTS) between the wars. Members of the Air Staff disagreed with the War
Department’s view for conduct of the war. The Air Staff believed that such an air
offensive could end the war and thus make an invasion unnecessary.13 The execution of
this strategy called for an intensive, well-orchestrated and uninterrupted six-month
campaign, once all the necessary assets were available in theater.14
Douhet had considered targeting as the most important role of the air planners.
Since the ultimate objective of AWPD-1 was to force the capitulation of Germany
through strategic bombing, the selection of targets was of the utmost importance.15 The
Air War Plans Division (AWPD) developed a list of 154 targets that, if destroyed or kept
out of operation, would disrupt or neutralize the German war-making capability. The
framers of AWPD-1 divided these targets into primary and intermediate air objectives.
They sub-divided the primary into four broad target systems, or sets, in the following
order of priority: the electrical power system, the transportation systems, synthetic oil and
petroleum industry, and, as a last resort, if the other targets proved ineffective, the
civilian population.16
The Air Staff acknowledged that the Luftwaffe, especially the German fighter
force, would have to be defeated before any invasion of the continent and possibly before
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the execution of the air offensive. “The only way for a strategic air force to destroy
fighter opposition” the air planners realized, “was to destroy the aircraft industry and
depend on the defensive fire of the American bombers.”17 Destruction of the Luftwaffe
therefore became the overriding intermediate objective, taking precedence over the
primary air objectives.18 The AWPD identified eighteen large aircraft assembly plants,
six aluminum plants, and six magnesium plants, the destruction of which would greatly
diminish the German fighter threat.19
In developing a methodology to execute their strategy, the Air Staff adhered to the
tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrinal theory developed by the ACTS. The
AWPD planners believed that heavy bombers, relying on speed, massed formations, high
altitude, defensive firepower, armor, and simultaneous penetrations at many places, could
make deep penetrations of German defenses in daylight hours.20 They ignored the need
for the development and use of long-range escort fighters in the execution of this
strategy. They saw the role of pursuit aircraft as defensive in nature to protect airbases
and vital areas. The Air Staff believed that the American bombers were technologically
superior to any German aircraft. The AWPD planners, therefore, adopted a strategy of
conducting High Altitude Daylight Precision Bombing (HADPB) raids against selected
target sets.
The AWPD recruited additional assistance from the Air Staff to help with the
forecasting of resource requirements to fulfill the developed strategy. Experts on
bombing probabilities complied the bombing tables and the personnel section calculated
the manpower requirements.21 The AWPD based force requirements on a 90 percent
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probability of hitting selected targets, and the total number of sorties that it would take to
accomplish the task in six months at the rate of five missions per month.22
The consolidated plan called for the production of 61,800 aircraft and required
180,000 officers and 1,985,000 enlisted personnel, totaling 2,165,000 men and women.23
The plan established a need for production capacity to replace combat losses every five
months. The heavy bomber totals equaled 11,000 and required 770 replacements a
month for the air offensive against Germany alone. The AWPD completed the plan and
General Arnold endorsed it on Sunday, August 12, 1941. Under Secretary of War Robert
Lovett reviewed the plan and integrated its findings into the War Department’s Victory
Program Report.24
On August 30, 1941, Arnold and Lovett presented the plan to General George C.
Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and the rest of the General Staff. There were
questions and some expressions of dissent, but Marshall was euphoric, “I think the plan
has merit” he said, “and I want the Secretary to hear the plan.”25 On September 11, he
presented the plan to Secretary of War Stimson and simultaneously sent a copy to the
Joint Army-Navy Board. Stimson approved the plan and had it prepared for the
President’s review, while the Board incorporated its tabulations in the joint estimate.26
Members of the Board accepted the air requirements set forth in AWPD-1 but were
skeptical about the claims made for strategic bombardment. The Board commented,
“Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost by weakening enemy strength
and greatly contribute to victory,” however, “by themselves they seldom, if ever, win
important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land
armies can finally win wars.”27
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The AWPD planners used a model devised by the Air Corps Tactical School
(ACTS) to develop their targeting packages. The ACTS conducted a hypothetical
bombing campaign against the key industrial centers in the American Mid-West and
evaluated the effects and impact it would have on the U.S. economy. The AWPD used
those estimates to define similar target sets in the Third Reich, a precedence that could
prove risky. As one analyst notes, “The strategic economic targeting methods formulated
ran the risk of mirror imaging whereby the key nodes of one’s own industrial
infrastructure became confused with the critical vulnerabilities of an opponent.”28
However, later interviews with German economic minister Albert Speer and results
posted by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the war revealed that the
methodology and target selection for the most part had been right on track. The error in
planning came from delays in re-attacking specific targets, insufficient bomb loads to
cause catastrophic damage, and the change in target priorities from the original targets
identified within AWPD-1.
The AWPD adopted the ACTS’ industrial web theory of strategic bombing and
developed target sets based on the assumption that the German war economy was already
fully mobilized and therefore vulnerable-an assumption that rested on faulty intelligence.
However, in fact, until 1942, Hitler had utilized so-called “blitzkrieg economics” to fight
short decisive wars. In other words, he mobilized only those sectors of the economy
necessary to wage a particular campaign, a policy that helped maintain the German
standard of living.29 The German economy did not actually undergo full mobilization
for war until 1942. The plundering of conquered countries afforded the Hitler regime the
luxury of partial or sectored mobilization until the dramatic shift in the strategic picture at
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the end of 1941, when the invasion of the USSR stalled and the Fuehrer decided to
declare war on the United States.
Another flaw in the industrial web theory was that it did not take into account the
large stockpile of reserve material that Germany possessed. Germany had twice as many
multipurpose and machine tools than Great Britain and probably still had more than the
U.S. half way through the war. This does not include the vital industries and machinery
Germany gained through conquest of Europe.30
The target sets developed in AWPD-1 focused primarily on targets within
Germany aimed at crippling the domestic economy, but Germany was essentially a
continental power. As long as Hitler’s European empire continued to provide the
essential raw materials, work force, and even critical manufactures, the Reich’s ability to
wage war would not be vitally affected by the strategic bombing campaign.31
HAPDB placed excessive emphasis on the offensive aspects of air warfare while
minimizing potential defensive strategies and technologies. The AWPD planners did not
anticipate enemy technological improvements such as the radar-based fighter and AAA
defensive networks.32 In general, the AWPD-1 exaggerated the effectiveness of airpower
and over estimated the physical effects of strategic bombing.33 Although the AWPD
planners conceded that some targets might have to be attacked more than once to achieve
the desired effects, they were overly optimistic in their analysis of the effects of
individual bombs upon the targets. Additionally, they did not make thorough analysis of
the tonnage of bombs required to destroy the heavy industrial equipment or take
sufficiently into account the bombs on hand and the payload capacity of future bombers.
Enemy public morale would also not be as fragile as American planners thought, which
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meant that they exaggerated the psychological impact of strategic bombing failing to
realize that bombing could easily arouse angry passions toward the attacker rather than
the victim’s own government.34 AWPD planners ignored historical lessons from the
Battle of Britain and assumed that the effect upon the German people would be different.
The most egregious error within AWPD-1 was the omission of long-range fighter
escorts as an integral part of the plan.35 The strategy of unescorted High Altitude
Daylight Precision Bombing raids placed too much stock in the Douhetian principles of
the battle plane and the speed and firepower of mass bomber formations. The inability of
the bomber to defend itself, and thus to “always get through,” affected the capability of
the combined air forces to pursue the air offensive and jeopardized the successful land
invasion.
One week after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the Air War Plans Division
(AWPD) began developing a plan that would commit the U.S. and Great Britain to an air
strategy against the Axis. AWPD-4, (Air Estimate of the Situation and
Recommendations for the Conduct of War), dated December 15, 1941, advocated giving
first priority to the protection of the Western Hemisphere and Britain, sustaining
American forces in the Philippines, and then directing every effort toward an air
offensive against the Axis in Europe.36
AWPD-4, expectedly recommended that the first priority for war production be
the AAF and then the sea and land forces as appropriate and consisted of three phases.
Phase One involved safeguarding the U.S. and Great Britain, and extending defenses to
Natal, the Cape Verde Islands, and Dakar. Phase Two dealt with waging a decisive air
offensive against the Axis powers in Europe, and engaging in a defensive effort in the Far
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East. The plan made concessions to support a possible land invasion of Europe if
necessary. Phase Three involved the conduct of sustained air offensives against Japanese
military and civil strength and the use of land forces where necessary.37
Prime Minister Churchill became concerned that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor might force the United States to deviate from the Europe first-strategy in favor of
a retaliation strategy directed toward Japan. He announced his intentions to come to
Washington with his military staff for consultations on grand strategy. In response,
President Roosevelt appointed a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff committee, that consisted of
the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, and General Arnold the AAF Chief, to
represent him in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Arcadia Conference, which lasted from
December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942.38 The outcome of the talks was that the
Combined Chiefs rejected AWPD-4’s bid for air priority in war production. Instead, they
recommended a sequenced victory program that prioritized the allocation of resources
and increases of air, land, and naval forces, and the manufacturing of munition schedules
according to individual operations. The Combined Chiefs thus accepted a modified
AWPD-1.39 The Arcadia Conference also established the mechanism for directing the
Anglo-American war effort and took steps toward creating a unified command of
combined forces in theaters of operation. The meeting established a composite
Combined Chiefs of Staff consisting of the British Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs of
Staff and their American counter-part.40
The American-British strategy thus gave first priority to Europe. The initial mode
of operations called for a combined strategic air attack by the British RAF and the U.S.
Army Air Force from bases in England. The purpose of the air offensive would be to
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cripple the German war machine through destruction of vital industries, undermine the
national will to resist, and topple the Hitler regime if possible. The plan provided for an
invasion of the continent, and sustained combined air and surface warfare. It called for
the creation of massive tactical air forces to support ground operations. The proponents
of strategic bombing, however, hoped that its success would make an invasion
unnecessary.41 The allied strategy called for maximum effort exerted against the Axis
and the diversion of minimum essential force necessary to safeguard vital interest. It
called for maintaining and safeguarding vital interest and positions in the Eastern Theater
to deny Japan access to raw materials vital to her war effort. Only after the defeat of the
Third Reich would the Allies launch an all-out strategic offensive against Japan.42
The Joint Chiefs approved dispatching a bomber force to England to join the RAF
in attacks against the Axis powers in Europe. The Combined Chiefs agreed that the first
two American heavy bomber groups available would operate independently in
cooperation with the British Bomber Command. Speed was the watchword. Planners on
both sides of the Atlantic wanted the (American) Eighth Air Force deployed at the
earliest possible moment. Guidelines set forth in AWPD-1 called for the Eighth Air
Force to consist of sixty combat groups, made up of seventeen heavy bomber units, ten
medium and six light bomber units, seven observation units, twelve fighter units, and
eight transport groups for a combined strength of 3,500 aircraft that would be available
by April 1943.43 Activated in January 1942, under the leadership of Major General Carl
Spaatz, the Eighth Air Force began its deployment across the Atlantic in May. It
comprised of a fighter command, a service command, a composite command for training,
and the VIII Bomber Commanded under Brigadier General Ira Eaker. However, of the
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heavy bombardment groups allocated to the Eighth Air Force, only the 97th was
operational by August 17, 1942.44
One thing that hindered the implementation of strategic bombing plans was the
diversion of air assets to other theaters. A new Japanese threat in the Pacific, for
example, forced the diversion of fifteen combat groups that were destined for Europe.45
The Anglo-American invasion of North Africa (OPERATION TORCH) also drained
resources from the Eighth. British Prime Minister Churchill opposed an early invasion of
the European continent, and advocated instead operations in North Africa supported by
heavy bombers at the expense of the air offensive against Germany. Churchill’s goal was
to protect the lines of communications to the Middle East and to position troops and
material for a possible main thrust into the Balkans to forestall a Russian drive that might
engulf all of Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs in Washington saw the invasion as a
diversion from the main effort against German-held Europe, but President Roosevelt had
to weigh their objections against the political necessity of military success in the near
future.46 The President also did not grasp the true dimensions of the air offensive against
Germany that would have allowed him to stave off political demands for immediate
results. The result was that, in July 1942, Roosevelt agreed to TORCH.47
The demand on the Eighth Air Force was severe: it dispatched two fighter groups
and four heavy bomber groups to North Africa, leaving only five groups of B-17s and
two groups of B-24s to carry out operations in Europe. Additionally, one-third of the
personnel who formed the newly created Twelfth Air Force came from the crews
assigned to VIII Bomber Command. The remaining groups of the Eighth provided
essential equipment, such as bomb loading equipment and transport vehicles to support
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the Twelfths operations.48 Fulfillment during 1942-43 of the United States Army Air
Force’s (USAAF) ambitious plans for a bomber offensive against Germany, as laid out in
AWPD-1, was not possible. Indeed, the Eighth Air Force found itself limited to raids
against submarine bases on the Brittany coast, and industrial targets in France.
The North African campaign reflected disagreement over strategy in Washington
and mirrored confusion over the role of American bombing assets in Great Britain.
When General Eaker and his advance staff landed in England in February 1942 to set up
the VIII Bomber Command, Eaker had no written directive or letter of instruction
describing his purpose and giving him authority to pursue it. He understood General
Arnold’s verbal instructions and the intent of AWPD-1, but Arnold had no authority to
instruct him to implement it. When Eaker moved his headquarters near RAF Bomber
Command, he encountered his second problem. Air Marshall Harris, Commander in
Chief of the RAF Bomber Command, was determined that the American bombers would
join the RAF in conducting night area-bombing raids against German cities. This
threatened the absorption of VIII Bomber Command into the RAF Bomber Command
and the abandonment of the American strategic concept of daylight precision bombing.
Eaker, therefore, refused Harris’ recommendations and appeals.49
When Eisenhower and Spaatz arrived in England and assumed command of the
U.S. European Theater and Eighth Air Force, respectively, in June 1942, each carried
letters of instruction detailing lines of communication and directives under which all U.S.
force were to operate. Eisenhower’s guidance for air operations dictated gaining air
superiority to prepare for and support a land invasion, without a detailed list of strategic
targets or direction.50 Spaatz, as Commander of the Eighth Air Force, possessed no
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authority to make strategic air decisions. As executive agent of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, Air Chief Marshal Portal exercised broad strategic direction for air operations, but
he did not designate targets or exercise tactical control over operations. Final authority
for all operations rested with General Eisenhower as European Theater commander.51
Despite the uncertainties the Eighth Air Force faced, its leaders were anxious to
get available bomber units into action at the earliest possible opportunity and selected
target systems for the earliest phase of operations. Eaker described the job of the VIII
Bomber Command as “the destruction of carefully chosen strategic targets, with a
secondary purpose of determining its capacity to destroy pinpoint targets by daylight
accuracy bombing and the ability to beat off enemy fighters and evade antiaircraft
opposition.”52 The initial daylight bombing raids focused on the destruction of
submarine bases and support structures, aircraft factories, key munitions establishments,
and lines of communication.53
In August 1942, President Roosevelt asked General Arnold for his
recommendation regarding which combat aircraft to produce in 1943 in order to gain
complete air ascendancy over the enemy. Arnold turned to the AWPD, which completed
a study the following month entitled AWPD-42: Requirements for Air Ascendancy.54
The report differed from AWPD-1 only in terms of the number of targets and adjustments
to target priorities. The plan defined primary and intermediate objectives with
corresponding target sets. The intermediate objective of defeating the Luftwaffe through
the destruction of aircraft assembly plants and engine factories retained overriding
priority. AWPD-42 revised the primary target list placing U-boat factories, holding pins
and bases as the first priority, followed by the German transportation system, electric
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power stations, and synthetic oil plants. It added aluminum plants and synthetic rubber
plants as additional target sets.55
The Eighth Air Force had completed only six missions before the writing of
AWPD-42, none of which provided an opportunity to evaluate the defensive capability of
the Luftwaffe. However, the planners still believed in the defensive capability of the
bombers and saw no need for the production of long-range escort fighters.56 AWPD-42
confidently predicted “that our current type bombers can penetrate German defenses to
the limit of their radius of operation without excessive losses.”57
AWPD-42 urged that Navy not receive any allocations of heavy or medium
bombers from the 1943 production. This provision, together with the competition that
aircraft production posed to the building of ships, aircraft carriers, and naval aircraft,
caused the Navy to reject AWPD-42 in its entirety.58 The Joint Chiefs never accepted
AWPD-42. Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stimson, however, approved the
requirements, and the plan became the pattern for expansion in the American aircraft
industry.59
Arnold hailed the survival of the idea of strategic bombing. “The principal
objectives of the air forces in this new plan as well as in the old,” he pointed out to
Spaatz, “are to be obtained by precision bombing.”60 Spaatz further refined the mission
of the Eighth Air Force and issued a list of specific targets for attacks in occupied France
and the Low Countries. The current weakness of the force determined the choice of
targets. The tactical radius of the British RAF fighters limited the choice to objectives on
or near the European coast. The Priority of targets were aircraft factories, railroad
marshalling yards, and submarine installations.

This target list governed operations
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until October 1942. The shallow penetration missions offered an excellent opportunity
for the newly formed bomber units to cut their teeth and develop tactics, but the fact that
all the objectives lay within friendly occupied territory raised serious political issues.61
American bombers launched their first strategic air attack in Europe on August
17, 1942 against the giant railway marshalling yard at Rouen in France. RAF fighter
planes escorted them to their target. All twelve bombers reached the target and returned
safely with approximately half the bombs placed within the target area. This operation
presented no preparation for more distant attacks into Germany without fighter cover, and
where anti-aircraft artillery was much more concentrated. Additionally, this attack did
little to prove the ability of the B-17 bomber formations to defend themselves.62 The VIII
Bomber Command flew its second mission on August 19, again with heavy RAF fighter
cover. A force of twenty-four B-17s attacked the aircraft factories at Abbeville with
outstanding results and no losses. The next six missions were within easy range of the
British escort fighters and only shallowly penetrated enemy-occupied territory,
encountering slight enemy fighter opposition.63
On August 21, during an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the Wilton shipyard in
France, the American bombers were late for their link up with the RAF fighters, and had
a brisk battle with enemy aircraft. USAAF Headquarters recalled the bomber formation,
but twenty-five Me-109s and FW-190s fighters attacked over the Dutch coast. It was the
first time the B-17s had faced a concentrated fighter attack without protection from
friendly aircraft.64 During a twenty-five minute running battle, the German fighters
damaged one B-17, killing one pilot and wounding five crewmembers. The bomber
formation claimed six damaged enemy fighters.65
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On September 6, VIII Bomber Command conducted the first simultaneous attack
on two targets by diverging B-17 bomber forces. Enemy fighter opposition was fierce
and resulted in the first heavy American losses.66 Out of the seventy-six bombers
dispatched on the mission, two bombers failed to return, and seven suffered damage.
Personnel losses included one pilot killed, five wounded, and eighteen crewmembers
missing in action.67 After the mission, persistent bad weather set in and forced aborts or
mission delays until October 2.
The daylight bombing campaign reached a minor climax on October 9 in a
bomber raid against the heavy German armament, steel works, and transportation
network at Lille.68 It was the first large-scale American mission. One hundred and eight
bombers launched to attack the primary target, and seven B-17s flew a diversionary
sweep to Cayeux. A combined effort of American and British fighters provided escort
for the mission. During the mission, the Eighth Air Force lost four bombers and an
additional forty-six received damage. Allied fighters and bomber gunner crews downed
four enemy fighters, although crews made exaggerated claims of damaging or destroying
over twenty-five enemy fighters. The bombers dropped 167 tons of 500-pound high
explosive bombs on the target areas.69 Although the American aircraft experienced
numerous technical difficulties and bomb dispersion was not accurate, the British press
praised the raid as a great victory for the American bombers. Ground observation
credited the attack with completely stopping work at the Hellemmes textile factory and
causing severe damage to the power station, boiler works, and turbines at the Fives-Lille
steel establishment.70
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Overall, the American strategic bombing of German-controlled Europe during
1942 and early 1943-produced little visible progress. The forces available were
inadequate to achieve decisive results. The effects of the bombing campaign were
gradual, cumulative, and during the course of operations rarely measurable with any
degree of assurance. Bombers returned repeatedly to strike targets that they seemingly
had destroyed before. The lack of a clear focus and visible evidence of success,
combined with the mounting aircraft losses and casualties, began to affect the morale of
the bomber units. Crews found a sense of accomplishment only in the completion of their
twenty-fifth mission, which brought relief and rotation out of the theater.71
While the USAAF strove to perfect the tactics for executing HADPB, the value of
these raids came under debate in Britain. The basic question was whether American
bombers could make effective daylight attacks without prohibitive losses. The British
repeatedly urged that America abandon its policy of HAPDB and join Bomber Command
in the execution of night assaults.72 “I noticed that the Americans had not yet succeeded
in dropping a single bomb on Germany,” Churchill commented in January 1943.73 The
British complained about the number of aborted American missions, the low number of
missions flown, and about the appearance that Britain was carrying the weight of the air
offensive against Germany. Eaker countered the criticism by pointing to the diversion of
Eighth Air Force assets to support other mission requirements-assets that industry had not
yet been able to replace. Weather, too, had hindered bombing operations, he asserted.74
At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the Allies agreed to meet and discuss
these issues and to refine the objectives of a continued air strategy and prepare for the
eventual invasion against Germany.
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CHAPTER 3
CASABLANCA AND THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference in North Africa, Roosevelt and
Churchill along with the Combined Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the future conduct of
the war. There was sharp disagreement between the Allies over the proper strategy for
defeating the Axis. At the time of the conference, it had become apparent that a bombing
offensive would not reach a sufficient scale for airpower alone to achieve decisive results,
and that an invasion of the continent was necessary to bring about the defeat of
Germany.1 Airpower advocates still believed that, if given the appropriate assets and
time, strategic bombing could bring about the collapse of the Germany. However, the
overall grand strategy of the Anglo-American alliance called for an invasion. What
remained was determining the role strategic bombing would play in that strategy and the
order of priority it would receive.2
The British had become concerned about the slow build-up of American bomber
forces and the lack of attacks on targets within Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
(CCS) set about developing a strategy that would integrate the capabilities of both the
American and British bomber forces into a combined effort. However, differences arose
about the method of executing such a strategy.
The German defensive network had thwarted the attempts of Bomber Command
to conduct daylight-bombing raids. Additionally, American and British planners
disagreed over the principles of target selection. British analysts did not place much
stock in the American concept of attacking individual key industries that represented a
bottleneck in the German economy. Air Marshall Harris referred to this group of selected
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targets as panaceas, and stressed that only by night area-bombing could the Allies reach
their targets and bring destruction to the German economy. The failure of early
American attempts at daylight precision bombing to produce decisive results added
credence to this argument. Harris took his case to Churchill, who urged Roosevelt to have
the American bomber forces join RAF Bomber Command in conducting night area
bombing raids.3
General Eaker, commander USAAF VIII Bomber Command, argued that the
American bombers were not equipped or trained to carry out night raids. Furthermore, by
pursuing independent operations the two forces could complement each other and
provide continuous pressure on Germany. Eaker succeeded in persuading the Prime
Minister to reverse his position and to give the USAAF VIII Bomber Command the
opportunity to prove their contention. “How fortuitous it would be if we could as you
say, bomb the devils around the clock and give them no rest,” Churchill commented.4
The strategy for air operations developed by the CCS and issued in the
Casablanca Directive stated that: “The U.S. and British bomber forces would conduct a
joint U.S.-British air offensive to accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation
of the German military, industrial, and economic system and undermine the morale of the
German people to the point where the capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.
This means weakened to a point to permit initiation of final combined operations on the
continent.”5 The Casablanca Directive made it clear that airpower was not to attempt to
win the war on its own, but produce the conditions by which the armies could achieve
victory. Since RAF Bomber Command was already fully engaged in the air offensive
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against Germany, the burden of planning the combined bomber offensive fell on the
USAAF.
General Arnold formed a Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to conduct
scientific analysis of the industrial objectives in Germany whose destruction would
weaken the enemy most decisively in the shortest possible time. The committee
identified sixty such targets and nineteen target systems. The COA stated that the
expected results would be cumulative and that, once adopted, the plan required relentless
execution.6 The systems suggested by the committee consisted of the German aircraft
industry, ball bearings, petroleum, grinding wheels and crude abrasives, non-ferrous
metals, synthetic rubber, submarines, military transport vehicles, and the transportation
system.7
On March 8, 1943, the COA reported its findings to General Arnold. After
Arnold and his advisory council favorably considered the report, he forwarded it to the
United Kingdom for coordination with British authorities and the Eighth Air Force. A
committee consisting of representatives from the (British) Air Ministry, the Ministry of
Economic Warfare, the RAF, and the Eighth Air Force reviewed the report and
developed a final list of primary air objectives that included seventy-six targets in six
systems, broken down into intermediate, primary, and secondary objectives.8 The
committee recognized that the destruction of the Luftwaffe was necessary for effective
strategic bombing and for a successful invasion. Therefore, the committee gave its
destruction overriding priority as an intermediate objective. The priorities of the primary
air objectives were German submarine yards and bases, the ball bearing industry, and
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petroleum production. The committee designated synthetic rubber plants, and military
transport vehicles as secondary air objectives.9
After the determination of the principal targets, there remained the task of
developing an operational plan to accomplish their destruction. For this purpose, General
Eaker appointed a committee composed of British Air Commander Sidney Bufton,
Brigadier General Haywood Hansell, Brigadier General Fred Anderson, and staff officers
from the Eighth Air Force. He instructed the committee to resolve the forces required to
accomplish the air war objectives and develop the chronological order in which the
attacks would take place.10 The Eaker Committee concluded that the projected bomber
strength would execute the plan in four-phases. During Phase One (April - July 1943),
missions would focus on the submarine yards that were within the range of available
fighter support. During Phase Two (July - October 1943) the combined offensive would
concentrate 75 percent of its effort on the destruction of fighter assembly plants and
aircraft factories within a 500-mile radius, and 25 percent against submarine facilities. In
Phase Three (October 1943 - January 1944) the Allies would dedicate 1,746 available
bombers to all tasks, while in Phase Four (begin early 1944) the 2,702 projected bombers
would be limited only to their operational radius.11
In developing the Combined Offensive Plan, Eaker stressed the need for
integration and cooperation between American and British bomber forces. “The most
effective results from strategic bombing,” in Eaker’s opinion, “would be obtained by
directing the combined day and night efforts of the U.S. and British bomber forces to allout attacks against targets which were mutually complimentary, in a campaign to
undermine decisively a limited number of selected target systems. The American
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bombers would bomb specific industrial objectives by day, and the RAF would attack by
night the cities associated with these objectives, the timing to depend on the tactical
situation.” 12
Eaker secured the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then the
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) approved the plan at the Trident Conference in May
1943. Sir Charles Portal, acting as executive agent, issued a directive to proceed with
what they now called the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan (code name OPERATION
POINTBLANK), to culminate with a cross-channel invasion projected for 1 May 1944.13
POINTBLANK failed to assign overall operational responsibility for integrating
the combined efforts of the two bomber commands. At Casablanca, the (CCS) assumed
that the chief of the RAF Air Staff would supervise the combined offensive as the agent
of the CCS, but no system was in place to ensure coordination between the two forces.
At Trident, the CCS agreed that, “While the forces of the British Bomber Command
would be employed in accordance with their main aim in the general disorganization of
German industry their action would be designed as far as practicable to be
complementary to the operations of the Eighth Air Force.”14
General Arnold wrote to Portal urging the creation of a central organization that
would be responsible to coordinate the bombing efforts of both bomber forces. On June
10, 1943, a separate directive established the Combined Operational Planning
Committee. The committee consisted of representatives from RAF Bomber and Fighter
Commands, Eighth Air Force Headquarters, VIII Bomber and Fighter Commands, and an
Air Ministry representative was available for liaison with the British Air Staff.15 The
committee was concerned with the coordination of tactical plans for specific combined
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operations, to be prepared well in advance of requirements, and to examine the tactical
execution of these plans. It was advisory in nature only, with no executive authority.
Responsibility for the conduct of operations remained with the commanders concerned.
It dealt primarily with the daylight bombing campaign, and became merely a liaison with
the Americans on tactical questions that might be common to both commands.16
The CBO plan and the separate directive purposely avoided committing the RAF
to rigid adherence to the objectives set forth; as far as practical the actions of the RAF
would complement those of the Eighth Air Force. The British and American forces thus
proceeded to engage in bombing the enemy according to widely divergent operational
theories. The RAF hoped to bring about a general disorganization of the German
economy by attacking civilian morale as the primary objective. Meanwhile, the
American bomber forces pursued the disruption of the German economy and military
industry through precision attacks as specified in the CBO plan. The execution of the
bombing offensive, therefore, became more divided in nature than combined.17
From January 21, 1943 until the issuance of the CBO plan and directives on June
10, 1943, the Eighth Air Force continued experimental operations to adjust its tactics and
procedures for the execution of daylight precision raids. A lack of resources seriously
curtailed the capability of VIII Bomber Command and it was not until March that it could
consistently launch a force of more than 100 bombers. The Eighth Air Force continued
to conduct operations against the German submarine yards and bases, in accordance with
the directive issued in October 1942 and the priorities established at Casablanca. A
shortage of bombers limited these operations to the coast of France and the Low
Countries, where fighter support was available.18
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American bombers attempted to extend the scope of their operations into
Germany proper, thus testing the quality of enemy opposition. The first attack by the
Eighth Air Force on Germany took place on January 27, 1943, when General Eaker
dispatched ninety-one bombers to attack the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven. Fiftythree bombers dropped their load on the target area and only three B-17s were lost during
the attack. The American bombers had received their baptism by fire over Germany
beyond the range of escorting fighters.19
By April 1943, Eaker was convinced that his daylight bombers had proven their
ability to penetrate German defenses. He therefore directed VIII Bomber Command to
begin to carry out precision attacks against key elements in the German war economy
producing submarines, aircraft, ball bearings, oil, synthetic rubber, and military vehicles
as dictated in the priority target list developed by the COA. Bomber Command,
however, in April had just 337 heavy bombers, and had an average of only 153
operational at any given time. The scarcity of aircraft therefore limited penetration
attacks into Germany to the coastal areas of Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Vegesack, Bremen,
Flensburg, and Kiel.20
The Eighth Air Force also lacked a long-range escort fighter to accompany the
bombers to the target area. American bombers could not avoid the German fighters in
daylight, nor outrun them. The B-17s had to depend on mutually supportive massed
formations - and the firepower and accuracy of their gunners - to keep the German
fighters at bay.
On June 11, 1943, VIII Bomber Command launched 168 bombers to strike the
Wilhelmshaven submarine facilities, and suffered a loss of eight aircraft. Missions to
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Bremen and Kiel two days later resulted in a loss of 26 out of 122 bombers and 26 out of
60 respectively, for loss rates of 21 and 43 percent.21 But the worst was yet to come,
especially since German resistance had stiffened considerably.
Indeed, the growing strength of the German fighter arm cast a shadow over the
Allies’ hopes for a successful invasion and continuation of the Combined Bomber
Offensive. By June of 1943, German production of fighters had risen to over 1,000 a
month. The heavier Allied bombing attacks had resulted in a greater concentration of
enemy fighters, so at this time 70 percent of the Luftwaffe’s fighter force was in the
Western Theater of operation. Germany established five fighter defensive belts across
the occupied territories and Germany proper. Radar early warning systems linked
together with ground stations directed the German fighters to targets. Each ground
station controlled a fighter within a box and a belt consisted of a whole series of these
boxes touching each other. Additionally, a continuous searchlight belt covered the Ruhr
integrated with anti-aircraft guns.
Consequently, from June 1943 to the spring of 1944, the destruction of the
Luftwaffe became the main objective of the Combined Bomber Offensive. The CCS
made that clear in a directive to the Allied bomber forces giving first priority to centers of
German aircraft production. The Eighth Air Force was to attack the principal airframe
factories and those making critical components, such as ball-bearings, while the RAF
attacked those industrial towns in which there was the largest number of aircraft
component factories, specifically targets east of the Ruhr and farther inside Germany.22
The Eighth Air Force faced the difficult problem of striking factories and
installations inside Germany without fighter escort, with a newly formed and
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inexperienced bomber force. Additionally, because of early bombing attempts, the
German aircraft industry had dispersed and subdivided into small units. Large aircraft
and component factories lay far inside German territory and heavily protected.23
On July 28, 1943, VIII Bomber Command made its deepest penetration yet into
Germany. A small force of 39 bombers attacked the AGO Flugzeugwerk at
Oschersleben, a major producer of German FW-190 fighters, which resulted in a fourweek loss in production. The day operation cost VIII Bomber Command 15 B-17s and
crews.24 The P-47s of VIII Fighter Command prevented further bomber losses.
Equipped for the first time with jettisonable belly tanks, 105 P-47s met the returning
bombers 260 miles from the English coast. Their appearance thirty miles deeper into
Germany than ever before caught a force of sixty German fighters by surprise. The
Thunderbolts shot down nine of their adversaries and drove the rest away. One P-47
failed to return.25
The Air Staff planners and officers of the Eighth Air Force had professed
confidence that the American heavy bombers could fight their way through German
defenses. Nevertheless, their hopes died out as missions over German soil beginning in
early 1943 ran into stiff resistance. It became evident that, in order for daylight strategic
bombing to continue, some sort of escort was indispensable. The makeshift 205-gallon
paper tanks used during the mission on July 28 were unsuitable above 22,000 feet. The
plan was to use them to enable the fighters to cross the Channel, climb to 22,000 feet, and
then jettison them before entering enemy territory. This process, however, produced only
a slight increase in range and tests began in August to develop a pressurized droppable
tank that would extend the range of fighters to 340 miles and beyond.26
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On August 17, the American bomber force celebrated its first anniversary of
operations by mounting the largest attack and deepest penetration to date. Eaker
launched 376 B-17s against two of the most critical targets: the ball-bearing plants at
Schweinfurt, which were producing over 40 percent of Germany’s ball-bearings, and the
Messerschmitt factory in Regensburg. A force of 146 B-17s set off to attack the
Messerschmitt factory and 230 bombers headed for Schweinfurt. The German defenses
went on alert and 300 fighters guided by radar intercepted the flight. Thirty-six bombers
were lost on the Regensburg mission and twenty-four disappeared over Schweinfurt, for
an overall loss rate of 19 percent. One hundred total aircraft were damaged or destroyed
compared to a loss of only twenty-five German fighters.27
The VIII Bomber Command did not attempt another mission of that size until
September 6, when it sent 407 bombers against the aircraft and ball bearing factories at
Stuttgart. A diversionary flight of 69 B-24s flew over the Northern Sea. The weather
hampered the mission, but 262 bombers succeeded in reaching and bombing the target.
Of those that reached the target area, 45 aircraft were lost.
A second raid on Schweinfurt in mid-October signaled the end of unescorted
daylight bombing. Almost 300 bombers, in two separate flights, returned to Schweinfurt
where German fighters again intercepted them. Although 220 bombers made it to the
target and inflicted heavy damage, 60 bombers, each with a crew of ten, were shot down
and another 138 damaged. Crewmembers called that day, October 14, “Black Thursday.”
Morale was low and for little wonder: aircrews were incurring a higher casualty rate than
any other branch of U.S. forces.28 The results from other bombing missions that same
week were less severe, but still grave: 152 bombers were lost out of 1,342 sorties flown,
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for a loss rate of 11.3 percent. An additional 42 percent sustained major or minor
damage. Over 1,500 crewmembers went down with their planes or were lost to enemy
POW camps. The total losses did not include wounded or killed crewmembers that
returned with their planes. Air Force leaders concluded, “We can no longer afford to
launch sorties without fighter escort.” The high-loss rate of unescorted bomber
operations thus had brought about the curtailment of further deep penetration into
Germany. American bombers would have to contain operations within the umbrella
range of friendly fighter cover and recuperate from its losses until long-range fighters
were available.29
The daylight bombing campaign had reached a crisis. The Eighth Air Force
simply could not gain air superiority over Germany until it had a long-range fighter
escort. A few P-38 Lightning and the P-47 Thunderbolts were in theater in late October,
equipped with two of the new 75-gallon pressurized wing tanks, which extended the
planes operational radius to 520 miles. But the plane that eventually solved the problem
of long-range escort was the P-51 Mustang, a fighter of exceptional endurance and
capability even when loaded with heavy supplies and fuel. The first newly equipped P51s Mustangs, with a maximum range of 1800 miles, joined the Eighth Air Force in
November 1943.30 To defeat the German fighter force, General Spaatz reverted to Billy
Mitchell’s original concept and ideas. Escort tactics took on a distinctively offensive
character. Previously ordered to stick with the bombers, beginning in early 1944 fighter
pilots were encouraged to leave the formations and seek out and destroy the enemy
fighters in air-air combat.31

52

The CBO had reached the end of its planned second phase. It became a matter of
utmost concern to determine whether it had accomplished its objectives, and if the
timetable remained the same for the planned invasion. The QUADRANT papers, which
contained the overall estimates of the CBO, stated that by forcing the enemy to
concentrate a large portion of his air force in the western front in a defensive campaign,
the bomber offensive had made a major strategic contribution and that daylight attacks
were actually succeeding in striking the vitals of the German aircraft industry. The
Luftwaffe was in a vulnerable position now, but the opportunity to neutralize it, if
missed, might never recur. The Eighth Air Force felt confident that it could accomplish
the goal of destroying the Luftwaffe if given the time to build up the necessary force.32
But Air Marshall Portal stated bluntly that POINTBLANK was a full three months
behind schedule, which meant that the planned cross-Channel invasion (OVERLORD)
would have to be delayed. The build-up of the Eighth Air Forces’ required strength was
also seriously behind schedule. The Eighth had only received 816 heavy bombers out of
the planned 1,068 aircraft agreed upon at Trident. The British and American planners
thus became more conscious of the need for accelerating and intensifying the bombing
campaign.33
To bring the Eighth’s assets up to the desired level, America doubled its
production efforts and curtailed the diversion of aircraft to other theaters. Arnold and
Spaatz, to ensure the most effective exploitation of the CBO, recommended to the JCS a
reorganization and build-up of the U.S. strategic air force in the Mediterranean. As a
result, the JCS directed General Spaatz to place the Fifteenth Air Force, consisting of
twenty-one heavy bomber groups and seven long-range fighter groups, along with the
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Eighth Air Force, under a central U.S. Strategic Command to support the CBO. The
Fifteenth Air Force would augment the Eighth’s efforts by striking at industrial areas and
selected targets in southeast Germany.34 Portal argued against Arnold’s proposal to
combine the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces into a single command because he thought it
would interfere with coordination between the British and American bombing efforts.
But, since the matter was an American issue, he pledged to give the plan his full support
once the CCS had agreed to it.35
The added bomber strength and long-range fighter escorts revitalized the strategic
air war. On January 11, 1944, the Eighth Air Force conducted its first attacks into
Germany since October 1943 with P-38 and P-51 escorts. A large Force of B-17s and B24s set off to bomb aircraft industrial targets in and around Brunswick, Oscherleben, and
Halberstadt with thirteen operational fighter groups in support. The attack force faced the
strongest German fighter opposition to date.36 The weather deteriorated and over half the
bombers and the majority of the fighters returned before reaching their targets. Since the
bombers were attacking different cities, the Mustangs had divided into different groups to
support the attack. The 354th Fighter Group arrived alone over Brunswick with its 44 P51 Mustangs and staved off determined enemy attacks upon the remaining 220 bombers.
During the ensuing melee, the P-51s shot down fifteen enemy planes without suffering a
single loss.37 Major James Howard, commander of the Squadron, came across a
formation of Me-110s about to attack a B-17 bomber group. He at once dived on the
enemy planes and single-handedly broke up their attack. With six probable kills, he
received the only Medal of Honor given to a fighter pilot in air combat over Europe.38

54

General Arnold and General Eaker were buoyed by the Eighth Air Forces’
newfound success in inflicting damage on the German industry and the Luftwaffe. The
presence of fighter escorts had taken the Germans by surprise and proved effective. Over
a two-month period, the American P-51s reduced the German fighter force by nearly 44
percent.39 In addition to providing bomber escort, the American fighters conducted
tactical raids on German airfields, supply depots, and transportation nodes.40 But the
Allies had under - estimated German powers of recuperation in the past, and the deadline
for the Normandy invasion was fast approaching. The CCS prepared to step up the pace
of the CBO.
During the week of February 19, 1944, the Allies launched what they hoped
would be the fatal blow against the Luftwaffe. The Americans executed 3,800 bomber
sorties and dropped 6,000 tons of bombs, out of the combined USAAF-RAF effort of
19,177 tons, against all the major German aircraft production plants. The RAF, for its
part, undertook 2,351 sorties against five industrial cities. Fighter escort sorties
numbered 3,700. Two hundred and twenty-six American bombers were lost for a loss
rate of 6 percent per mission, while the RAF suffered a 6.6 percent loss rate during night
operations. Total fighter losses were twenty-eight planes.41
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reported that the operations against
the aircraft industry had resulted in damage to 75 percent of the buildings responsible for
90 percent of German aircraft production.42 The “Big Week” campaign undoubtedly
deprived the Luftwaffe of many badly needed airplanes, but the Allied estimates of the
impact of the air onslaught were too optimistic. By February 1944, the German industrial
dispersal program initiated after the raids in early 1943 was having a cushioning effect.
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More importantly, the bombs dropped by American aircraft were not powerful enough to
destroy vital machine tools, which the Germans were often able to retrieve from the ruins.
Nonetheless, although German production eventually recovered and even rose above preFebruary levels, production plunged following “Big Week” and the next months total was
less than half what had been planned.43
For the Luftwaffe the air battle proved to be disastrous, not because of aircraft
losses, but through the loss of well - trained experienced pilots. It is estimated that the
Luftwaffe’s losses in February, accelerated by “Big Week,” amounted to 33 percent of its
total number of single-engine fighters and 20 percent of its fighter pilots. Intercepted
secret communications indicated that, from January through May 1944, the Luftwaffe
lost 1,684 pilots.44 This forced Germany to replace those experienced pilots with youth
who had half the usual training time. These new pilots seemed noticeably more
interested in avoiding contact with the American fighters than shooting down bombers.
American fighters, moreover, downed 440 German planes in air-to-air combat and
destroyed close to 9,000 enemy fighters on the ground through tactical air raids during
this same period.45 As a result, when the Allies went ashore at Normandy in June there
were only 300 German fighters available to contest the landing.46
By April 14, the CBO had resulted in Allied air superiority and achieved its
intermediate objective of minimizing the Luftwaffe threat. The strategic attacks on
fighter production in 1943 may have succeeded in containing the German fighter force at
a size that permitted the close tactical victory of February 1944. Precision bombing was
the instrument and occasion for achieving victory, but the formal victory was tactical and
relied on the primacy of American fighter aircraft.
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Breaking the backbone of the Luftwaffe in February 1944 opened the door over
the Reich for pursuit of the primary air objectives of the CBO.47 The bomber commands
now had the force necessary to bring about the destruction of the German military and
industrial complex. However, only three months remained until the planned invasion of
Europe, and support for the Allied ground operational goals would divert the strategic
bombers from pursuing the air offensive.48 The CBO would have to wait and follow the
invasion, instead of preceding it as planned.
Eisenhower had become concerned over the lack of unity of effort between the
two bomber commands and stressed the need for unity of command during the conduct of
OPERATION OVERLORD. As he put it, “I am anxious to have there a few senior
individuals that are experienced in the air support of ground troops, otherwise a
commander is forever fighting with those air officers who regardless of the ground
situation, want to send big bombers on missions that have nothing to do with the critical
effort.”49 The operational control of air assets in the development of the overall air plan
for OVERLORD was another issue of paramount importance to Eisenhower. In a
message to General George C. Marshall, in March 1944, he insisted that, “responsibility
in operational control and the authority for coordination of all efforts must lay in the
hands of the Supreme Commander.” That meant, he added, that “authority for operational
control of forces allocated to OVERLORD whether engaged in the conduct of close
operations or deep penetrations (tactical or strategic) will reside with me.”50
The basic strategic decision about the employment of air assets in support of
OVERLORD was decided on March 25, 1944. General Eisenhower met with all the
major figures concerned with the application of airpower, at the Air Ministry in London.
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Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s Deputy Commander for OVERLORD, and the planners at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), submitted a plan for a
systematic assault on the railway centers of North-Western Europe to facilitate the
invasion. Spaatz, however, argued that the strategic bombers could better support the
invasion by conducting sustained operations against the German oil production
facilities.51 But, the planners contended that time was the issue and that long-range
strategic bombing inside Germany could have no favorable effect on the battlefield at
Normandy. Target analysis experts agreed that the German stocks of oil were such that
the effects would be delayed four or five months. Eisenhower, therefore, agreed with
Tedder and approved the transportation plan.52
On April 14, the CCS formally turned over control of all forces to Eisenhower, as
Supreme Allied Commander, for preparation and support of the invasion of Europe
(OPERATION OVERLORD).53 The heavy bomber forces offered the firepower
necessary to breach the so-called “Atlantic wall”- German fortifications along the French
Coast - destroying the enemy’s interior lines of communication, and enabling AngloAmerican ground troops to break out of the beachheads.54 Since Eisenhower expected
enemy opposition on the landing beaches to be “far greater than anything we have
encountered in the European war,” he realized that, “we will be dependent upon the
bombardment effect of our heavy bombers to help us both tactically and strategically.”55
On D-Day the bombers would conduct heavy attacks on the beach defenses ahead of the
landing craft. After the troops were ashore, the bombers would operate against hostile
communications and airfields to delay and harass land reinforcements. Eisenhower
advocated a concentrated air offensive against the rail transportation systems, the internal
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communication networks in France, and the coastal German battery positions. That
meant, he insisted, that all Allied air forces would have to be devoted exclusively to that
purpose.56
The air offensive in France proved decisive. Out of the ten German coastal
batteries, only one was able to open fire during the invasion. Air attacks rendered
German transportation and communication networks almost completely inoperable.
German officers interviewed after the war tended to single out Allied airpower as the
main reason for the success of the invasion. As one German officer recalled,

Your strategic bombing of our lines of communication and transportation resulted
in our being unable to move our reserves in time and prevented our troops from ever
coming into effective tactical deployment against your forces. . . . Without this strategic
bombing and your gigantic aerial coverage of the landings of your troops, your invasion
ships and barges would have been sunk or driven out to sea, and the invasion would have
been a dismal failure. . . . We had forty divisions in position of readiness and your
bombing of road nets, transportation and lines of supply made it impossible to move our
troops rapidly, if at all.57

Within a few days of the invasion, Eisenhower directed the strategic bomber force
to begin the campaign against the Germany synthetic oil plants and petroleum industry.
This operation also served to divert the remnants of the Luftwaffe away from the invasion
force to defend the German industrial fabric. By the end of June 1944, the Reich’s
production of aviation fuel had been reduced to a trickle and the Luftwaffe had to rely on
accumulated stocks. Its defeat was now an accomplished fact.58
After the invasion, Eisenhower retained control of the bomber forces for several
weeks and employed them to provide direct support to the fighting in Normandy. “By
September 20th the winter weather will be upon us, at which point air operations will
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become spasmodic,” he stated in a memorandum to General Walter Smith, “Air
operations represent the only area where we enjoy superiority, therefore we must strive to
maximize its use.” He added that “the direct attack against Germany is of secondary
priority, and that all air forces are to be concentrated toward the close support of ground
troops, smashing the communications lines, and the neutralization of Crossbow (V-1 and
V-2 weapons).”59 The Allies began carpet –bombing enemy concentrations and prepared
the way for the final break-through of the German lines. German staff officers serving in
France afterwards described the terrifying immobility of the battlefield. “The troops
could not move. . . . [and] the communications systems broke down; artillery and antitank pieces were knocked out; and tanks were immobilized in craters or beneath heaps of
dirt and debris; the effect on morale was shattering.”60
On September 14, Eisenhower returned control of the strategic bombers to their
respective commanders to resume the air offensive. The air defenses of Germany had
crumbled. With the Luftwaffe now combat-ineffective, the Allies had command of the
air and the freedom to pursue the destruction of the German interior. The Allied ground
advance into France eliminated the German’s early radar warning systems and made
possible the placement of the RAF navigational aide ground stations on the continent,
which extended the range of operations.61
During the last year of the war, the bomber campaign came of age. A single attack
by a single group often did as much damage as an attack by the whole command in the
previous year.62 The bombing of Germany was relentless: the Allies dropped 1.18
million tons of bombs, out of the total 1.42 million tons for the war, during the last year.63
The continuous day and night bombing raids had a tremendous impact on the German
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war-making capability. They dramatically reduced the production of synthetic oil,
chemicals, and explosives. The attacks on the German transportation debilitated the
railway and waterway systems. “ The war is over in the area of heavy industry and
armaments, from now on the material preponderance of the enemy can no longer be
compensated for by the bravery of our soldiers,” Albert Speer, Reich Minister of
Armaments, gloomily remarked in January 1945.64
Speer rightly added air power had played a crucial role in bringing the Reich to its
knees. Nevertheless, it did not achieve the aviator’s dream of rendering unnecessary the
bloody struggle on the ground. Indeed, the ultimate fact was that the armies still had to
win the war on the ground.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBING
CAMPAIGN
“One may argue the exact degree of contribution made by strategic bombing to
the final decision. The war against Germany was fundamentally an infantry war
supported by air power.”1 General Spaatz
Perhaps no aspect of WWII has remained more controversial than the contribution
of strategic bombing to the ultimate victory. Some critics maintained that the eighteen
months of bombing had apparently produced little effect on either the German war
production or German morale. Sir Henry Tizard publicly denounced the whole enterprise
as a misguided failure that had hurt Britain more than Germany.2 Controversy centered
on the ineffectiveness and apparent inhumanity of RAF Bomber Command’s policy of
area bombing directed against German civilian morale and the employment of the
immense material and human resources devoted to the bombing campaigns.
Additionally, critics attacked the long-delayed effectiveness of the U.S. precision
bombing efforts.3
Robert Pape has argued that strategic bombing was not decisive, and made
virtually no difference in the outcome of the war. He claimed that the decline in the
German war economy was due mainly to territorial losses, not strategic bombing. The
loss of iron ore from Western Europe undermined steel production, and the loss of the
Rumanian and Hungarian oil fields crippled oil production. Furthermore, he adds, even if
there had been no strategic bombing campaign, the war would have ended in the same
way and at about the same time.4 He credited airpower in general, and tactical airpower
in particular, with its support of ground forces and the conduct of operational interdiction
missions, with having been the decisive factors in the Allies’ victory.
63
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Haywood Hansell and other airpower advocates claimed that the diversion of
assets and the lack of priority in production prevented or delayed strategic airpower from
decisively affecting the outcome of the war. He concluded that, if the strategic air forces
had been equipped with the resources they requested and allowed to pursue without
interruption their original strategy as laid out in AWPD-1, airpower alone could have
won the war.5 For many aviators, the bombing offensive made sense only if it could
ultimately achieve decisive results on its own. In both the RAF and the USAAF, some
believed that strategic bombing could coerce Germany into capitulation. That view,
however, was not controlling the overall Allied strategic plan.6 “The potential of the
strategic air offensive was greater than its achievements,” stated Noble Frankland in his
book The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany. “This was primarily due to the
difficulty of obtaining a unified and concentrated policy through the channels of divided
command. Even so, eventually strategic bombing both directly and indirectly contributed
decisively to victory.”7
For the Allied forces as a whole, the bombing offensive made much more sense as
an important instrument complementary to the ambitions and objectives of all the armed
forces. The principles of employment sought to meet the needs of the other services,
which refused to accept that only one service was capable of ending the war on its own.
The invasion of Europe was the dominant element in the Allies plan. The role of
strategic bombing was to establish air superiority before the invasion, and to substantially
weaken the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. In this respect, bombing was successful
in a complementary role by contributing to winning air supremacy, setting the conditions
for an invasion, and assisting in winning land battles.8
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The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that Allied
airpower in general had been decisive in the war against Germany. In the air, its victory
was complete. At sea, its contribution combined with naval power eliminated the
German U-boat threat. On land, it helped turn the tide in favor of the Allied ground
forces. It made possible the successful invasion and brought the horror and suffering of
modern war home to the German people. Additionally, although the full effects had not
reached the German front lines, it brought about the collapse of the German economy.9
According to the USSBS, prewar assumptions had hindered effective employment
of airpower. The belief that the bomber could always get through, for example, had
caused unacceptable losses on unescorted bomber formations. The only way to affect
civilian morale was through severe attacks whose extent and weight reached
unacceptable humanitarian proportions. Prewar bombing experiments had failed to
provide any useful data about bomb effects on various types of structures. Prewar
intelligence about potential enemies proved inadequate for planners to select accurate
target systems. The most significant of the survey’s conclusions was that bombing
attacks required a repeated, sustained, and heavy effort in order to achieve decisive
results.10
The USSBS measured the damage, impact, and effectiveness of the air campaign
against the stated plans and objectives. During the war, Allied military and civilian
leaders conceived four strategies to defeat Germany, all of which depended heavily on
strategic airpower. The first was the industrial web strategy, which would use precision
attacks on key economic bottlenecks to cripple the German economy as a whole, fatally
weakening the social and political cohesion needed for resistance. The second strategy,
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strategic interdiction, would also use precision bombing but would focus on industries
critical to war production rather than seek a general economic collapse. The third
strategy followed a Douhet pattern of using area incendiary bombing of population
centers. All three approaches aimed to break German resistance through airpower alone,
so that a cross-Channel invasion would be either unnecessary or a reasonably easy
undertaking against an already beaten foe. The fourth strategy aimed at destroying the
German army through the combined weight of Soviet and Western ground offensives.
Strategic airpower would support this strategy through operational interdiction attacks
designed to have a direct and immediate impact on ground operations.11
The industrial web theory embodied in AWPD-1 proposed destroying selected
target sets on which all major German industrial sectors depended. The AWPD planners
based this strategy on the assumption that the German economy had fully mobilized and
that the war with Russia had stretched its capability so tautly that destruction of a few
carefully selected nodes by air attack might cause its collapse. The Air Staff planners
hoped that the resulting economic collapse would ruin Germany’s ability to produce war
material, produce widespread social disruption, destroy German morale, and possibly
topple the state. The key was identifying a link between targets that supported the war
effort and civilian welfare. The target priorities selected were the Luftwaffe (aircraft
factories, aluminum plants, magnesium plants) followed by electrical power stations, the
transportation network, and the petroleum industry.12
AWPD-1 plan emphasized the need for concentrating all bombers on the
destruction of chosen objectives. The failure to achieve the needed concentration of
forces imposed severe limits on what the bombing offensive could achieve at the time of

67

its probation. It was perhaps unfortunate for bombing forces that the decision to prepare
for invasion coincided with the beginning of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO)
itself.
The armies had arrived in 1943 at the point where it was possible to invade
continental Europe, but the bombing offensive promised three years earlier had not even
seriously begun. Bombing was to fill the gap between the end of the Blitzkrieg against
Western Europe and the time when Britain and her allies should re-enter. It had achieved
relatively little in terms of tactical preparations for an invasion or implementation of an
independent war-winning strategy. The gap had not been filled precisely because the
operational and material preparations for bombing were a long-term undertaking and
could not be provide at short notice as a military stop-gap. In 1943, both the armies and
the air forces had arrived independently at the stage where they could launch their own
strategic operations, and although both were committed to the defeat of Germany, there
was disagreement as to which strategy should receive the most emphasis.13 Therefore,
the CBO followed, rather than preceded, the invasion.
By early 1943, the U.S. had finally deployed a significant bombing force to
England to support the air offensive. American strategy shifted from the industrial web
theory to a new strategy of strategic interdiction that focused on sectors of industry
directly linked to the combat power of the German army. The main catalyst for this
change was the Casablanca Directive and the resulting Combined Bomber Offensive
Plan. Strategic interdiction was to reduce the enemy’s capacity to field forces by
destroying the production facilities that manufactured weapon systems.
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Like the industrial web theory, strategic interdiction was a precision bombing
strategy that sought to destroy an entire industrial system by striking only a small number
of targets. The key assumption in this strategy was that the destruction of certain
identifiable components early in the military production cycle would make impossible the
large-scale manufacture of finished military equipment such as tanks, aircraft, and
artillery impossible. Ideal targets for this strategy included primary and semi-finished
products with special military use, such as ball bearings, machine tools, rubber,
aluminum, magnesium, nickel, steel, and nitrates.14
The Casablanca Directive called for the progressive destruction and dislocation of
the German military, industrial, and economic systems and the undermining of the morale
of the German people to diminish their capacity for armed resistance in preparation for an
invasion. The Combined Bomber Offensive air plan called for the destruction of the
Luftwaffe as an intermediate objective and then the destruction or dislocation of support
systems, including the German aircraft industry, ball bearing plants, petroleum
production and supplies, grinding wheels and crude abrasives, non-ferrous metals, rubber,
submarine yards, and various munitions factories.15
The Eaker Plan, which became part of Combined Bomber Offensive strategy,
called for all-out attacks, by the combined day and night effort of U.S. and British
bomber forces, on targets that where mutually complementary to undermining selected
objective systems. Eaker further explained that this implied precision bombing of related
targets by day and night where tactical conditions permitted, and nighttime area-bombing
of the cities associated with those targets.
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Sir Arthur Harris, head of Bomber Command, agreed with the Eaker Plan in
principle, but disagreed with the limited attacks on what he referred to as panacea targets.
Harris believed that the main intent of the Casablanca directive was to undermine
German will to fight through the progressive destruction of the German military,
industrial, and economic systems. This called for widespread, general destruction as
opposed to the Americans plan for the thorough destruction of a few essential industries.
This difference in interpretation resulted in a lack of synchronization that, in turn, led to
non-mutually supportive attacks that diminished the effectiveness of both bomber units’
campaigns.16
In June 1943, the CBO plan (Operation Pointblank) gave the German aircraft
industry first priority for destruction and assigned the ball bearing industry as a
complementary target. The German ball - bearing industry was at first heavily
concentrated and centrally located; indeed, in the beginning approximately half the output
came from plants near Schweinfurt. The initial heavy American bombing of the German
ball - bearing industry began in August 1943, with subsequent follow-on attacks in
September and October.17 The presence of the Luftwaffe, and the lack of air superiority,
reduced the effectiveness of the raids and resulted in heavy American aircraft losses.
The postwar inspection of German documents revealed that the destruction of the
ball - bearing industry, at the cost of a small expenditure of effort, would have thoroughly
crippled key industrial sectors in two to eight weeks and brought war production to a
complete standstill. Although American bombers inflicted significant damage on the
factories during these raids, the bomb loads were not heavy enough to destroy the
machinery. Additionally, too much time elapsed between the attacks, which allowed the
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Germans to disperse and restore the factories. The reluctance of the RAF to support
attacks against the ball - bearing industry through complementary night area raids further
complicated the problem. From examination of the records and testimony of war
production officials and personalities, there was no evidence that the attacks on the ballbearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.18 When asked
how decisive effects could have been achieved against the ball - bearing industry Albert
Speer, the Reich’s Minister of Armaments, had a ready answer. “If all the plants had
been attacked at the same time and if area attacks had been included and repeated three or
four times at intervals of 14 days, in conjunction with follow-on attacks every eight
weeks to deter reconstruction and sustained for a period of six months,” he said, “then
production would have been brought to a standstill and paralyzed thousands of armament
plants.”19
The attack on the German aircraft industry, primarily on airframe plants, began in
the summer of 1943. The Germans had distributed the aircraft plants throughout the
Reich. Isolated raids early, in 1941 and 1942, had caused further shifts in production to
the east and dispersion of individual plant units to reduce their vulnerability. In the 1943
attacks, American bombers dropped 5,092 tons of bombs on fourteen airframe plants,
which did cause a drop in fighter production between July and December. Because of
these attacks, the Germans began a vigorous program of subdividing and dispersing
plants and placed increased emphasis on fighter production.20
The culminating attacks on the aircraft industry began in the last week of
February 1944, “the Big Week.” With the protection of long-range fighter escorts, Allied
bombers dropped 3,636 tons of bombs on every known aircraft plant. The attacks
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however did not knock out production for long. In fact, during the whole year of 1944,
the Luftwaffe received 39,807 new aircraft of all types compared to 15,596 in 1942
before Allied bombing of the aircraft industry began. Production during the month
following the attacks was actually higher than it had been in the months preceding them.
One of the main reasons for the increase in German aircraft production was the transfer
of production authority from the Luftwaffe to the Speer ministry.21 Speer mobilized
unused capacity and undamaged machines, reorganized inefficient managements, reduced
the number of models produced, and subdivided production into small units that were
virtually immune to attack. “The raids on the aircraft industry in early 1944 caused
serious anxiety and doubt, however, in this case it became evident that our industry was
more elastic than had been assumed and our anxieties lessoned,” Speer later
commented.22 Nevertheless, like the attacks on the ball - bearing plants, bombing of the
aircraft plants showed a continuous attack would be necessary to knock out a single
industry with the weapons available.
The aircraft plant and ball bearing campaigns illustrated the difficulties of
applying strategic interdiction to a continental power such as Germany, which controlled
vast resources. Germany was not exceptionally vulnerable to economic shortages so long
as it could extract resources from Europe as a whole. Temporary scarcity of particular
materials might occur, but the State could intervene to overcome them. The huge size of
the resource base provided many opportunities for substitution and conservation, and as a
result, there was no Achilles heel or a small, vulnerable set of factories the loss of which
would cripple all war production. Even if they had existed, it was nearly impossible to
identify soft spots in the German war economy and monitor the daily performance of all
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sectors to predict accurately how their destruction would ripple through the economy.
The Allies underestimated the effects that Speer’s reorganization had on production and
slighted the impact of substitution. Information was inadequate to produce reliable
macroeconomic analysis, let alone the comprehensive microeconomic analysis required
for strategic interdiction by precision bombing.23
The Allies assigned overriding priority to the defeat of the Luftwaffe as an
intermediate objective. Pursuit of the CBO air objective and a successful land invasion
depended upon achieving air superiority. Although the attacks on the German aircraft
plants and ball bearing factories failed to destroy production, they served a
complementary purpose. The mere presence of Allied bombers over the target areas held
the majority of the German fighter force in the West for defense. The development and
presence of long-range American escort fighters achieved tactical victory in the air. The
CBO contributed indirectly to this victory through the destruction and dispersal of
manufacturing plants, assisted in the combat attrition of German fighters, and disrupted
training. The loss of experienced pilots, along with the presence of long-range fighters,
ensured that the Luftwaffe was never a serious threat again. The supplemental attacks by
the strategic bombers on the German oil industry and the resulting loss of critical aviation
gasoline completed the victory for the Allies in the battle for air superiority.
The pressure to minimize Allied ground casualties during the cross-Channel
invasion and subsequent breakout from the Normandy area compelled a shift to an
operational interdiction strategy designed to produce immediate reductions in German
ground force mobility and fighting capability. General Eisenhower assumed control over
all strategic bomber forces and tactical air support, from April 1944 to September 1944,to
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ensure a combined effort in pursuit of that goal. The targets selected for the operational
strategy included the destruction of the French and German transportation networks and
Germany’s oil production and petroleum infrastructure.24 The core target was the
German railway network because it carried the vast majority of military vehicles and
other heavy equipment. Rather than cut individual railway lines, the idea was to create
roadblocks by bombing the principal marshalling yards, which acted as transportation
hubs. The goal was to make it impossible for the Germans to move significant
reinforcements into France. The plan called for the destruction of seventy-six rail centers
in France, Belgium, and West Germany.
Oil was the foundation of German military operations. The Air Staff planners
assumed that the Reich had stocks of finished petroleum products sufficient for only a
few months of military operations. They estimated that the loss of more than 50 percent
of Axis output would quickly reduce German tactical and strategic mobility as well as
frontline delivery of supplies. The expected destruction of fifty-four oil installations
would force Germany to cut military consumption by 25 percent, even if it retained
possession of the Rumanian oil fields. Allied planners estimated that there would be a
major impact within six months.25
In May 1944, the Allies began their assault on the synthetic oil plants and the
Rumanian oil refineries. The impact of the raids became apparent almost immediately.
British intelligence intercepted German communication on the Ultra system indicating
general petroleum shortages. “As a result of renewed interference with the production of
aircraft fuel by allied action, most essential requirements for training and carrying out
production plans can scarcely be covered by quantities available. . . . To assure defense of
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the Reich and prevent gradual collapse of readiness of the German Air Force, it has been
necessary to break into the OKW reserves.” The allies had uncovered a weak spot in the
German economy and moved rapidly to exploit it to the fullest.26 “The assaults on the oil
industry in May 1944,” said Speer, “caused the first serious shortages of indispensable
basic products and produced the greatest anxiety for the future conduct of the war.”27
The chief sources of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, were
thirteen synthetic plants. The major source of crude oil products was the Ploesti oil fields
in Rumania and the Hungarian fields, which accounted for a quarter of the total supply of
liquid fuels in 1943. The 1944 attacks, together with the mining of the Danube River,
reduced Rumanian deliveries and in August of that year, Soviet occupation eliminated
that source of supply and increased dependence on the synthetic plants.28
The RAF and USAAF conducted 555 separate missions against 133 oil industry
targets, plus numerous raids on reserve oil depots and petroleum oil and lubricant (POL)
dumps. Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily, as bombers had hit every
major plant by the summer of 1944. These targets received 13 percent of the total bombs
dropped in 1944 and early 1945 and the result was a 93 percent reduction in production
of aviation gasoline. The strategic attack against petroleum and the synthetic oil industry
was extremely effective due to the volatility of the target. By July 1944, Germany’s oil
production had dropped to about 30 percent of what if had been in the spring and it
continued to decline in ensuing months. Bombing raids in January 1945 brought
production to near zero and left Germany dependent on what little reserves remained.
The oil campaign had succeeded in lowering output of fuel below the levels necessary for
German forces to fight efficiently and significantly reduced the operational capabilities of
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both the German air and ground forces. After January 1945, large-scale operations either
by the Luftwaffe or by motorized units of the German army were impossible.29
German authorities viewed those attacks as catastrophic. A by-product of the
raids on the oil industry was a reduction in the production of ammunition; synthetic
rubber production, moreover, suffered from the lack of gasoline products, nitrogen, and
other ingredients. Stockpiles and production were so low that, had the war continued,
Germany’s rubber shortage would have become critical. Ammunition production also
relied on the synthetic oil plants for nitrogen. Allied bombing of oil-chemical plants
brought the explosives industry to an almost complete standstill. Stockpiles that were in
ample supply in mid-1944 were completely exhausted.30
The success of the attacks on transportation was a major contributor to the Allied
victory in Normandy. Because the Germans depended on railroads to move reserves and
supplies, destruction of that logistical support made it difficult to re-deploy and sustain
reserves once the invasion began. Thus, the Germans lost the race to reinforce Normandy
before the invasion began. Additionally, bombing forced German infantry units to fight
without adequate artillery support, and created a shortage of ammunition supplies.
German motorized and mechanized units’ encountered difficulty in moving forward into
Normandy because of the heavy damage to the road networks.
The transportation offensive opened in April 1944 with heavy attacks on French
rail yards and bridges designed to prevent the Germans from moving reinforcements from
Germany or redeploying reserves already in France to meet the Normandy invasion.
There were eighty critical transportation targets in France: Bomber Command and the
Eighth Air Force each attacked roughly half of them. In mid-April, French railroad
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traffic began to decline. Fighter-bombers conducted attacks on bridges and trains the
following month and accelerated the decline. By late May, French railroad traffic was
half what it had been in January and by mid-June, it had ceased to operate.31
In September 1944, strategic bombers reverted to control of the air commanders.
Chief Air Marshall Tedder forwarded a plan based on the campaign model against the
French transportation system, to destroy the Reich’s transportation system and bring the
Nazi industry to a halt. The final plan divided Germany into nine districts for attack.
American bombers, to be augmented by tactical fighter raids, would conduct precision
attacks against transportation centers, while Bomber Command used marshalling yards
and railroad stations in city centers as the primary aim points for their area attacks. The
goal was to smash the rail network, thus preventing the movement of raw materials,
finished goods, and parts. Critical to success was the disruption of not only the German
railway system, but also the canal and waterway systems.32
The attack on the German transportation system, beginning in September 1944,
was the single most important cause of Germany’s ultimate economic collapse. The
effects of the bombing on the German rail and water transportation systems were almost
exactly as envisioned in AWPD-1 and AWPD-42. Transportation targets received almost
one-third of the total bombs dropped throughout the campaign from 1944-1945 with
decisive results.33 Bombing raids decimated rail yards, depots, bridges, and canals. After
October 1944, it became impossible for the rail and waterway systems to meet
transportation requirements. From December on, all sectors of the German economy
were in rapid decline.
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The loss of transportation facilities completely disorganized the flow of basic raw
materials, components, and production of semi-finished materials. The movement of coal
to the steel plants, power stations, railheads and other industrial factories became
impossible. Dwindled coal stockpiles caused assembly plants to shut down and had a
rippling effect on civilian and military operations. As The Strategic Bombing Survey put
it,

The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized
the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to
move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the
German Army. . . . Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. . . . Her armament
production was failing and total disruption and disintegration were well under way. . . .
Even if the final allied land victories had not occurred the German Armies without
ammunition and the impending collapse of the supporting economy would have had to
cease fighting within a few months.34

The bombing forced reduced production, but more importantly, the main effect was the
Germans inability to put weapons and supplies in the hands of the divisions actually
fighting.
The impact of Britain’s night area bombing raids during the Combined Bomber
Offensive was undoubtedly the more spectacular. However, it was also the most
controversial from both a moral standpoint and debate over its effectiveness. The idea of
attacking civilian population centers and inflicting casualties on non-combatants
continues to be a subject of debate. In this respect, the British implemented Douhet’s
idea that, in a total war, all inhabitants were legitimate targets and the civilian population
was the easiest to affect through attacks on their support structure and morale.
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British area bombing strategy came about as an operational necessity and in
response to events. German defenses and the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of British
bombers undermined early daylight attempts against selected targets. The subsequent
transition to night operations required large target areas due to the lack of visibility,
navigational aides, and accurate bombsites. Additionally, the British government felt
pressured to retaliate against German cities for damage suffered during the Battle of
Britain.
The British Bombing Survey Unit gauged the overall result of city bombing by its
effects on fifty-eight main population centers. By June 1943, British bombers had burned
an average of fourteen square mile per city; by March 1944, the level of destruction
reached thirty-six square miles and continued to rise. British bombers attacked sixty-one
major cities and thirty-one towns and razed 128 square miles, amounting to 50 percent of
the urban area. Area bombing rendered 7.5 million people, or 11 percent of the German
population homeless, killed 305,00 civilians, and wounded 780,000. The catastrophic
losses inflicted on such cities as Cologne, Hamburg, and Dresden shocked the entire
German people.35 The key to the destructive impact of the raids on those cities lay in the
development of improved bombs, such as the 12,000-lb Tallboy and the 22,000-lb Grand
slam special earthquake bombs.
“The first attack on Hamburg in August 1943 made an extra-ordinary
impression,” Albert Speer recalled. “We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of
this type of attack on another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to
sustain armaments manufacture and war production and might bring about a rapid end to
the war. However, the raids were not repeated soon enough or with the same weight, and
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in the meantime it became possible for the civilian population to adapt themselves.”36
The damage caused to industry by concentrated high explosive attacks varied, but was
mostly temporary in nature. The most effective attacks involved the use of a mixture of
high explosive and incendiary bombs. Fire was most effective in destroying workers
dwellings and had the greatest impression on the general morale.
A prerequisite for attaining such results was the reduction of towns by a
succession of raids separated by small intervals. Day attacks made in addition to night
raids, using incendiary bombs, would have contributed to the overall effect. The Allies
employed this system of attack against Dresden in February 1945, but the war was
practically over by then. This showed a lack of coordinated effort between the two
bomber commands. Additionally, the considerable length of time between attacks
allowed the restoration of water mains and the creation of natural firebreaks, which
lessened the impact of subsequent attacks.37
Although Bomber Command never employed the use of gas bombs, the campaign
satisfied the requirements of an ideal Douhet strategy. But British planners
underestimated the powers of resistance of the German people and did not take into
account the fatalistic frame of mind that a civilian population acquires after numerous air
raids. There is no evidence that area bombing produced any political pressure on German
leaders or contributed much to the collapse of the German economy. There were no mass
demonstrations against the government or any other form of popular activity. Civil
disobedience was insignificant. Far from discouraging loyalty to the Nazi state, bombing
tightened political ties and led to political apathy while individuals were obsessed with
finding solutions to their own personal problems. The civilian population became
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dependent on the functioning Nazi relief organizations. Raids had only a minor effect on
the overall economy and practically no effect on war production. Absenteeism from
work did not substantial increase because of bombing. Many workers simply continued to
work in routine fashion. The German armament industry sustained a steady increase in
munition production until June 1944. Allied bombing widely and seriously depressed
German civilians. However, depressed and discouraged workers were not necessarily
unproductive.38 The British attempts to destroy the German workers morale had failed.
The British Bombing Survey Unit concluded in its special report that area attacks
against German cities were not responsible for more than a very small part of the
reduction in German production.39 The demands on power supplies following attacks
provided the best gauge of the effects of night area attacks upon production. These
frequently dropped to between 30-40 percent, but usually recovered rapidly after a week
to their original level. The destruction of the gas grid in the Ruhr caused heavy damage,
which resulted in a serious and continuous reduction in the processing of products.
Because of the breaching of the Mohne Dam flooded the Ruhr valley and put the fresh
water pumping station out of action. Despite this, however, German workers restored
adequate supplies of water within a couple of weeks.40
In summary, the city attacks by the RAF did not substantially affect the course of
German war production. German war production as a whole continued to increase.
While production received a moderate setback after a raid, it recovered substantially
within a relatively few weeks. As a rule, the industrial plants were located around the
perimeter of German cities and characteristically these were relatively undamaged.
Additionally, dispersal of important industries began in 1942 and 1943. From 1944 on,

81

German authorities transferred vital industries to caves and other underground
installations and virtually invulnerable to attack.41
However, one cannot dismiss the direct and indirect effects of the British areabombing offensive quite so easily. The raids on oil facilities helped clear the skies of
German aircraft and its contribution to the transportation offensive paved the way for the
successful allied invasion and continued push toward Germany. The indirect effects
caused changes in the conduct of the German lives and brought the horror of modern war
to their doorsteps. It brought about a change in German production requirements that
required a shift to an increased emphasis on fighters and the attempt to develop new
technologies in the form of the V-2 bombs and jet aircraft to combat the assault. It forced
the diversion of a large segment of Germany’s work force to the unending task of
reconstruction of bombed factories and public utilities, engaging a million and a half
workers.
The CBO served to open a second front in the West. Together with the American
bomber effort, the British Bomber Command forced the Luftwaffe to keep the bulk of its
strength in Germany for defense, thus limiting German airpower on the Russian front and
weakening the German army effectiveness. British area bombing then undoubtedly
hampered the German effort in much more than a marginal way.42
Allied airpower dropped over 2.7 million tons of bombs on the German
countryside in an attempt to pursue a war winning strategy through strategic bombing.
However, despite the tremendous punishment inflicted, from a standpoint of coercion,
strategic bombing failed to force Germany to surrender.43 To understand why strategic
bombing failed to force Germany to surrender, it is helpful to divide the problem into
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parts. First, the Allies underestimated the resilience of the German people, their ability to
adapt to the harsh conditions, and the control that a police state has over the hearts and
minds of its people. Additionally, the Allies’ assumptions about the condition of the
German economy were in error. Germany had not fully mobilized her economy and was
not suffering from overexertion or from a lack of resources. On average, the German
workweek was shorter in duration then those in Britain and the United States. Germany
did not mobilize women to work in the factories, like the U.S. and Britain. Germany
continued to produce civilian goods, and especially women products such as cosmetics,
until the last years of the war.
Until Allied ground forces began their advance, Germany was essentially a
continental power. Strategic Bombing directed against the German economy had little
impact until Germany could be denied access to the assets and manpower from all of
Europe. The targets attacked produced no significant shortages for the civilian population
and had little impact on the execution of their daily lives. Although German leaders tried
to mitigate the damage, aerial punishment played no important role in the decision to
surrender.44
The final form of the Allied goals for war against Germany was set at the
Casablanca conference in January 1943. The Allies determined they would accept
nothing less than the unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan, and Italy. The
Casablanca Directive laid out a strategic air campaign against Germany in terms of
eventual physical capture of that nation by surface forces. Unconditional surrender
meant not only complete military victory but also the destruction of German sovereignty,
the democratization and de-Nazification of political institutions and the reduction of the
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population. Additionally, the Allies had agreed to the division of Germany into zones of
occupation, resettlement of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and transfers of forced
labor to the Soviet Union.45 The biggest fear of the German leaders was that of Soviet
occupation and retaliation for the atrocities committed by German forces, something that
unconditional surrender would make inevitable.
The failure of Germany to surrender underscores the importance of the
relationship between the cost of surrender and the cost of resistance. Leaders abandon
territorial objectives only when the cost of continued resistance exceeds the expected
benefits of further fighting. The German leaders did not believe that the conquest of
Germany itself had become inevitable. The Nazis believed that a severe blow could still
shock the West into breaking the coalition with the Soviet Union and making a separate
peace.46 Therefore, no matter how much damage strategic bombing inflicted, it could not
force capitulation as long as the German leaders believed their defensive positions were
still tenable.
The results from interviews with German leaders and findings made by the
USSBS revealed that the initial priority of targets selected by the AWPD would have
crippled the German economy and hampered the war effort had the Allies carried out
effective attacks against them. However, as the bombing offensive began, target
priorities often changed out of necessity. The Allies never attacked many of the original
targets, except as a possible complementary target. One of the primary targets not
attacked was the German power system.
Allied planners believed that the German power grid was highly developed and
that another sub-system could easily compensate for the loss of one area. However, the
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USSBS showed that the German electric power situation was extremely precarious. The
destruction of five large generating stations would have reduced capacity by 8 percent,
and the destruction of forty-five plants would have reduced capacity by over 40 percent.
Additionally, generating and distribution facilities were relatively vulnerable and
recuperation would have been extremely difficult. The Chief German electrical engineer
stated that the war would have been finished two years sooner if attacks had been
concentrated on German power plants. All areas of production, as well as the civilian
sector, would have felt the results of these attacks.47
The Air War Plans Division adhered to the traditional principles of war in
developing strategies and forecasting requirements; however, the Chain of Command
violated the basic principles of objective, mass, economy of force, unity of command,
and security during the execution of operations.
Objective means directing every military operation toward a clear, decisive, and
attainable goal. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy’s
armed forces and will to fight.48 The objective of the air strategist did not necessarily
correlate to the overall objective in the Allies’ grand strategy. Target priorities were
continually changed based on operational necessity. This often detracted from the overall
effectiveness of the bomber units.
The principle of mass requires the concentration of overwhelming combat power
at the decisive place and time to achieve decisive results.49 Until late in 1943, the USAAF
and British Bomber Command did not possess the assets to allow them to conduct mass
operations. The diversion of resources away from Europe to support other operations
further complicated this problem.
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Economy of force deals with employing all combat power available in the most
effective way. That means that military leaders should allocate minimum essential
combat power to secondary efforts and concentrate mass on the principal effort.50 The
Allies’ grand plan detailed a Europe-first strategy in which they would strive first to
achieve the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, the Allies continually diverted forces to
support secondary efforts in the Pacific and Africa draining resources that were required
to achieve the primary objective.
Security means never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Unless one can secure and defend his base of power, it will be very difficult to sustain the
strategic offensive and to continue to prosecute the war.51 Security relates to the inability
to protect the bomber force in the conduct of operations. This primarily pertained to the
absence of long-range fighters.52
Unity of command means that all forces are responsible to one commander. It
requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a
unified purpose and effort.53 The Combined Chiefs of Staff oversaw operations and
developed strategy, but exercised no control over the prioritization of targets or the
execution of operations. The individual bomber commands (RAF Bomber Command and
the U.S. Eighth Air Force) retained that authority. Only when General Eisenhower, as
Supreme Allied Commander, assumed control over all air assets in the theater did the
Allies achieve unity of command and unity of effort.
The lack of unity of effort opened windows of opportunity for the Germans to
conduct repairs or disperse industrial factories. Without the heavy destructive power of
Bomber Command, the American bombers were not able to bring about the destruction of
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selected targets. Likewise, the American bomber forces did not follow up the success of
the British area raids to prevent the restoration of emergency services and to provide
continued pressure on the target area during the day.
The achievements of the daylight-bombing offensive went far toward
substantiating the prewar prophecies of the airpower enthusiast. However, the hopes that
strategic bombing would render the need for a ground offensive unnecessary did not
come to fruition - armies still had to win the war. The debate, therefore, will continue as
to whether or not strategic bombing alone could have won the war if given the
appropriate resources, time, and adherence to the original air war plans. Nevertheless,
the ground and air campaigns were so closely interdependent that is impossible to judge
what either of them might have accomplished if it had gone unassisted by the other. For
reasons of policy the Allies could not have afforded to rely on air power alone, no matter
how effective it may have proven, in defeating Germany. The effect would have been to
leave too much of the European continent open to Soviet occupation. The Allies from
SLEDGEHAMMER onward had plans for rapid deployment of troops onto the continent
and into Germany in the event airpower or other means brought about the rapid collapse
of Nazi Germany. The inescapable conclusion is that air and ground together achieved
the goals of the American strategy of annihilation, in which strategic bombing played a
significant factor. The strategic bombing offensive helped win the battle for air
supremacy, paved the way for the invasion of the continent, assisted in winning land and
sea battles, and crippled the German war machine.54
Albert Speer later explained the full impact of the bomber offensive. “The real
importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before
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the invasion of Europe,” he said. “That front was the skies over Germany.” The
unpredictability of the air attacks turned every inch of German controlled territory into a
kind of front. The defense against the Allied bomber offensive forced Germany to divert
fighter aircraft and personnel from other theaters, increase production anti-aircraft guns,
and stockpile ammunition all over the country. In addition, hundreds of thousands of
soldiers had to stay put in position by their guns-often inactive for months at a time. “As
far as I can tell,” he concluded, “this was the greatest lost battle on the German side.”55
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